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Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 25 July 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Stephen J. Ledogar (United States of America)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 599th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I would note the departure, during the recent recess, of the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Baljinnyam, to whom I wish, on behalf of all of us, all the best in her future activities.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Peru, Sweden, Finland, Romania and Canada. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): It is a pleasure for me to see you, Ambassador Ledogar, an outstanding representative of the United States of America, presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The United States and Peru have always cultivated lasting links of friendship and cooperation, which have now been reinforced by a common effort to strengthen democracy in the Americas, to fight drug trafficking and the spread of weapons. What a happy coincidence that this very morning under your presidency it should fall to me to take the floor to inform this unique multilateral negotiating body that the Government of Peru has invited the Latin American countries in the Rio Group to attend a special meeting of their Foreign Ministers in Lima next November, in order to agree for the first time in our region on measures of arms limitation, strengthening of security and transparency among Latin American democracies. This Peruvian initiative falls within the context of the historical breakthrough which has occurred recently in the world and which has led to the end of the cold war and the establishment of a promising international climate founded on stability and international cooperation.

In the area of security and arms limitation this process of mutual trust and understanding led first to the Washington Treaty, whereby two categories of intermediate and short-range nuclear missiles were limited, and later to the United States-Soviet agreement on the non-production and destruction of the bulk of their respective chemical-weapon arsenals; the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe; and the imminent signature of the first START agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning cuts in a substantial number of strategic weapons. In addition, a few weeks ago President Bush proposed a peace plan for the Middle East which was followed by the arms control and disarmament plan proposed by President Mitterrand and the endorsement by the Group of Seven of Prime Minister Major's initiative, supported by Japan, for the establishment of a register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations.

In short, the impressive changes which have occurred in East-West relations have been accompanied by a series of important steps in the area of security and arms limitation. In this context Latin America could not be an exception, nor could it stand aside. That is why, at the summit of heads of State and government of the Ibero-American countries held in Guadalajara, Mexico, the President of Peru, Alberto Fujimori, proposed Latin American

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disarmament with the objective of using the resources thus released to promote economic and social development in the region. This initiative forms part of a new concept of national defence designed to maintain the stability of democratic and legitimately constituted Governments in the face of the internal threats of underdevelopment, drug trafficking and terrorism, external debt and critical poverty in Latin America.

Consequently, I am pleased to inform the Conference on Disarmament that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru has communicated to the ambassadors in Lima of the member countries of the Rio Group - Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela - a proposal for the holding in Lima next November, on dates to be decided, of a special meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Rio Group, firstly, to agree expressly on a joint renunciation of all types of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and secondly, to reach agreement on banning the acquisition, production or transfer in the future of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles for warlike purposes in Latin America, as well as the new generations of advanced systems of conventional weapons - I refer principally to fuel-air bombs with a massive explosive and destructive effect, laser-guided bombs and munitions, long-range extremely destructive multistage rocket systems, anti-radar and "stealth" technology. Also a ban on the introduction of nuclear propulsion in the attack submarines of Latin American countries. The third objective of the Lima meeting would be to devote itself to measures to build security, confidence and transparency among the democracies of the Rio Group, such as intensification of contacts between military high commands, cuts in troops and offensive weapons in border areas, mutual notification of military manoeuvres, invitations to attend them, visits to military facilities and the creation of a centre to register the transfer and production of weapons in our countries.

The Lima meeting will undoubtedly help to strengthen security, development and democracy in Latin America and will, I believe, mark a new era of solidarity and cooperation in the region. The democracies of Latin America, which are the faithful reflection of the hopes of their peoples, cannot stand aside from the process of peace and security which is under way in the world today. The Latin American democracies must base their relations on mutual trust and transparency in their national defence systems. Equally, the Latin American democracies cannot further burden future generations with external debts caused by the acquisition or manufacture of new and costly arms. The democracies in Latin America have first of all to secure the welfare of their peoples and work for constitutional stability and wholehearted respect for international treaties. The Latin American democracies must once and for all say no to arms trafficking, no to wars of aggression, no to suspicion and lack of transparency. Yes to a new order based on the full application of international law. Yes to human rights. In conclusion, yes to life, prosperity and solidarity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his most important statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): Let me first congratulate you, Ambassador Ledogar, on assuming the important function of President of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is confident that our work will continue to be effectively guided through your well-known diplomatic skills. I should also like to thank Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom for her distinguished contribution as the preceding President of the Conference.

World politics have undergone dramatic changes in recent years. As part of this process, there has been a significant evolution in perceptions of nuclear weapons. In January 1985, the Soviet Union and the United States undertook to start negotiations on nuclear and space arms which they had agreed "should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere". In December 1987, they agreed to eliminate all their land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles, to completely abolish one entire category of nuclear missiles. This was not only the first agreement on nuclear arms reductions in history. It also marked a breakthrough for intrusive verification provisions in international disarmament. The destruction of intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles has now reportedly been completed. Moreover, there is now every indication that we will experience the next breakthrough in nuclear arms reductions. Both Moscow and Washington have publicly declared that they are on the verge of finalizing the START agreement on major cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. This constitutes a diplomatic achievement we have every reason to praise. It is a great victory for disarmament efforts. By all accounts, it will be a militarily much more significant arms reduction agreement than the INF Treaty. However, it must be kept in mind that these reductions will only bring their strategic arsenals back to about the same level as when the negotiations started nine years ago. Let us, nevertheless, make sure that this agreement becomes an injection of vitality in our negotiations here at the Conference on Disarmament.

There have been other essential developments in the recent improvement in the international climate. One significant development concerns the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A number of States - including several countries in southern Africa, among them South Africa - have recently joined the non-proliferation Treaty. France, one of the nuclear-weapon Powers that has not acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, announced its decision in principle to do so. The most fundamental and far-reaching change has centred on Europe, the most heavily armed continent, where the two major military alliances confronted each other for several decades.

A totally new Europe is emerging. A Europe that has left entrenched rivalries behind, that has moved beyond the cold war. One element in the political transformation of Europe has been agreements on comprehensive military confidence-building measures and major reductions of conventional armed forces involving highly intrusive verification provisions. I would like to make reference here also to the declining trend in the total numbers of nuclear-weapon tests. In the Soviet Union, in particular, there has been a

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marked decline in nuclear-weapon tests, in part due to popular opposition for health and environmental reasons to such tests. Also the Nordic countries have to the Government of the Soviet Union expressed their serious concern.

The decline in testing must not, however, obscure the fact that tens of thousands of nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. We must not overlook the fact that, in spite of the incipient quantitative reductions, the qualitative development of nuclear weapons continues. The real purpose of testing is, no doubt, to develop more effective nuclear weapons. Nor must we forget that, in spite of the improved political climate, the testing of nuclear weapons continues. Furthermore, an end to nuclear testing would be a clear manifestation of a genuine will to pursue nuclear disarmament. It would also be a proof of our commitment to save and protect the environment. An end to testing would clearly demonstrate that we share and respect the worries expressed by millions of people as regards the environmental effects of nuclear testing.

The importance of a comprehensive nuclear test ban has long been widely acknowledged by the international community. For more than 30 years, the total prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons has been considered crucial to halting the nuclear arms race and a way of curbing horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. Year after year, the General Assembly of the United Nations has underscored the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The momentous changes in world politics, the end of the cold war, the actual reductions of nuclear weapons, and the prospects for further significant cuts in the nuclear-weapon arsenals, the breakthrough for intrusive disarmament verification methods, progress in the efforts to halt nuclear-weapon proliferation and the declining trend in nuclear-weapon testing are developments which suggest that the time has come to start negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is against this background that Sweden is today introducing to this Conference a draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The partial test-ban Treaty, which bans nuclear-weapon test explosions, and any other nuclear explosions, in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, has, for obvious reasons, reduced radioactive contamination of the atmosphere. As a disarmament measure, however, it has been of marginal importance since the Treaty does not contain provisions prohibiting underground nuclear explosions.

The Swedish position as to the need for urgent negotiations on a comprehensive test ban has not changed in the last decades. Together with a vast majority of other States, Sweden has consistently worked for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 expresses the commitment to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. This commitment is reaffirmed in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968.

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After close to almost three decades, still no negotiations are being conducted on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. On the contrary, it is even being stated that such a treaty is only a long-term goal.

Fundamentally, the case for ending nuclear testing rests on the need to put an end to a mad security system built on nuclear deterrence. However, there are also widespread concerns about the collateral effects of nuclear testing.

The United Nations study on nuclear weapons, which I had the privilege of chairing, provides an account of medical and environmental effects of nuclear-weapon production and testing. In my judgement, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the nuclear-weapon Powers to justify continued nuclear testing. To the vast majority of States it is not acceptable that year after year goes by without serious efforts to achieve a test ban - indeed, without even starting negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The re-initiation of negotiations on this matter has been urgent for many years. To refuse to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty defies the will of the overwhelming majority of States.

The draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that Sweden is introducing today is a revised and considerably extended version of the draft treaty submitted by Sweden in 1983 (CD/381 of 14 June 1983). The major changes have been undertaken with regard to the protocols of the draft treaty, dealing with a verification system and organizational matters.

In this new draft, we have tried to take into consideration developments during the last few years, above all in the United Nations, in the Conference on Disarmament and at the PTBT Amendment Conference, including protocol II of the proposals for amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty. We have of course also considered new working papers, proposals and contributions from individual countries. We have also taken into account the rapid scientific and technical developments.

Specifically, we recognize and have made an effort to build upon achievements in the realm of disarmament verification in recent years. We have, therefore, redrafted our proposals with regard to the organization which will oversee the overall function of the treaty and its verification arrangements. As envisaged in the new Swedish draft, the principal organ of the organization to oversee compliance with the treaty is the conference of the States parties. The other organs to be established are the executive council and the technical secretariat. In this context, we have not only made use of the terminology in the draft chemical weapons convention. We have also to a certain degree built on the conceptual approach in the negotiations on that forthcoming convention. In this context, we have built furthermore on the verification provisions of the threshold test-ban Treaty.

With regard to verification we have, of course, taken special account of the progress made in the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament. The technical achievements in the field of verification are such that effective international verification of a CTBT is now possible.

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The question of verification is no longer a technical one, but of a political nature. Given political preparedness to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the effectiveness of the verification regime is largely a question of the amount of resources which are allocated for this purpose.

An adequate verification system is a most important element in a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The legitimate right and duty of all States to participate in the verification of international treaties to which they are parties must be recognized. This political recognition must be supported by international technical arrangements that make it possible for all parties to gain access to the results obtained through the verification machinery. International cooperative measures are a cornerstone of the verification arrangements of this draft treaty. Sweden is committed to the work of establishing such international verification arrangements.

In a world where the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is obvious, a comprehensive test-ban treaty must be designed so as to encourage the widest possible adherence. It must, therefore, be non-discriminatory. The rules should be the same for all.

The draft treaty and its three protocols, containing measures such as seismic monitoring, surveillance of airborne radioactivity, satellite observation and on-site inspection, are altogether aimed at establishing a basis for an effective verification system. All in all, I hope that the new draft treaty submitted by Sweden will provide a political and technical basis for intensified work on the CTBT issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

Nuclear testing demonstrates that nuclear-weapon States insist on retaining the option of further developing these weapons of Armageddon. The continuation of nuclear-weapon testing is not in harmony with current trends in world politics. Neither is testing compatible with a concern for the environment and our common future. The ending of nuclear tests would be a major step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The prohibition of nuclear test explosions will also be instrumental in preventing the proliferation of such weapons.

The Conference on Disarmament is the proper forum to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Indeed, it is the very first item on its agenda. We can afford no more procrastination. The recent dramatic improvement in world politics shows every nation that the time has come to negotiate such a treaty. Let us start now.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for her most interesting statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Finland, Dr. Rautio.

Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): I have asked for the floor to introduce the latest "blue book", which has been circulated as a CD document (CD/1090). Like last year's report, the 1991 "blue book" is a joint report of countries which participated in the second round-robin test. A brief description of the

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test has also been circulated as a working paper (CD/CW/WP.350) by Australia, Canada, China, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Finland, France, Germany, India, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. That working paper was introduced in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons yesterday. In my presentation today, I will mainly deal with the conclusions of the test that are of more general interest than the analytical details as such.

In order that the exercise should follow a likely CWC scenario it was agreed that the samples for the second round-robin test should simulate an inspection of the chemical industry by including appropriate background chemicals. The laboratory that volunteered to prepare the samples chose to use charcoal, Tenax, XAD-2 and cotton buds as sample matrices in addition to aqueous samples. Some of the samples were spiked with octyl methylphosphonofluoridate, which, although a schedule 1 chemical, is not (within public knowledge) a CW agent. This meant that many laboratories did not have the necessary reference material (authentic reference substance or database information) to make a positive identification of the principal spiking substance. In the absence of a readily identifiable CW agent upon which to focus, the participating laboratories applied varying degrees of effort in identifying as many compounds as possible to allow judgement whether they were scheduled compounds.

Accordingly, to maximize the value of this second round-robin test, the objective of the test was changed from analysis of samples for CW agent and their degradation products to their content of any scheduled chemicals.

In the event the laboratories reported 17 scheduled chemicals, 31 other phosphorus-containing chemicals and 89 non-phosphorus chemicals. All laboratories identified the chemicals used as starting materials in the synthesis of the planned end-product, the pesticide dichlorvos. Only two laboratories reported chemicals belonging to schedule 1, the mixture of isomeric octyl methylphosphonofluoridates. All laboratories except one identified dimethyl methylphosphonate, which is a schedule 2 compound and appeared as an impurity of feedstock material. Six laboratories identified the mixture of isomeric dioctyl methylphosphonates which are also schedule 2 compounds and primary degradation products of the principal spiking compound. Three laboratories identified the mixture of methyl octyl methylphosphonates. Two laboratories reported detection of alkyl alkyl methylphosphonates but were not able to identify the actual alkyl groups. In addition to the octyl derivatives, four additional methyl phosphonates and methylphosphonic acid were reported.

All the participating laboratories considered the second round-robin test very useful, even though the original plan of the test did not materialize. The results obtained from the analysis of samples according to the revised objective probably raised many more questions than the original plan would have done.

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The need for background information on samples was discussed by the scientists of the participating laboratories. They considered it desirable to know whether the samples had been collected in an area of alleged use or in an industrial site. The participants also considered the analysis request, be it confirmation of preliminary identifications, identifying scheduled chemicals or structure elucidation of unknown chemicals, to be more important for the off-site laboratories than to know whether the inspection had been a routine or challenge inspection.

In the present test the laboratories were informed that the samples did not contain CW agents. This information caused some confusion, however, because not all laboratories were aware of the difference between a CW agent and a schedule 1 chemical and, accordingly, some did not look for members of the nerve agent families.

Information on the particular sampling points in the facility helped in understanding the production process. However, such information might be considered highly confidential by the facility, the kind of information that should not be revealed to a laboratory capable of doing in-depth analysis of all chemicals in the samples. This type of information is, naturally, available to the inspectors on-site, but there confidential information can be protected by the use of "blinded" instruments, i.e. those having only scheduled and related chemicals in their databases.

As shown by the test, a large number of chemicals can be tentatively identified with a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/MS), the instrumentation planned for on-site analysis, if reference spectra are available in the computer of the instrument.

The second round-robin test showed that if the analytical request is to identify any scheduled chemicals, the methods should be such as to allow detection of all individual compounds on the schedules. As long as the databases remain incomplete, samples should be monitored by techniques allowing detection of family members. Easily volatile chemicals such as phosgene and hydrogen cyanide require slightly different procedures than those optimized for nerve agents and mustards.

The scientists discussed the criteria and need to report chemicals other than scheduled ones to the future technical secretariat. This question was felt important since the number of chemicals that can be identified in off-site laboratories is greater than during on-site analysis. In this test the laboratories reported non-scheduled feedstock chemicals and the product of ongoing synthesis, plus their impurities and a large number of unrelated chemicals. It was pointed out that the identification of non-scheduled chemicals could be used to identify industrial processes and could corroborate the stated purpose of the process and be used as evidence of compliance. However, this would not necessarily be an indication of compliance all of the time. In the present test, toluene and trichloracetaldehyde confirmed that during the inspection the facility was producing dichlorvos.

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Some laboratories identified and reported sodium fluoride and octyl alcohols, which do not belong to the schedules either, but which could indicate earlier production of octyl methylphosphonofluoridates.

The need to identify and report non-scheduled chemicals is determined by the goal of the verification, whether it is to confirm the absence of non-declared scheduled chemicals or also to confirm that the current production of the facility is in line with the declaration. If the goal is to confirm the absence of non-declared scheduled compounds, the goal can be achieved on-site with "blinded" instruments. In this case, chemicals such as sodium fluoride and octyl alcohols would remain undetected unless they were included in the database as additional chemicals.

If the goal is to confirm a declaration, on-site analysis would require that the databases for the instruments contain data on the chemical products and their feedstock chemicals instead of data on scheduled chemicals. In this case, in addition to undeclared non-restricted production, undeclared scheduled chemicals would go undetected.

If both current production and the absence of scheduled chemicals are to be verified, the number of chemicals in the databases increases substantially. At present negative assurance seems to be the preferred objective. For the future tests, the group agreed that only scheduled chemicals should be reported.

The present test strongly emphasized the need for identification criteria in verification analyses. Some laboratories did not list any chemicals for which no reference material was available, and the identification of which would have had to be based on structure elucidation only. Some laboratories listed chemicals solely on the basis of electron ionization spectra after comparison of the recorded spectra with those in commercial libraries.

The scientists discussed the degree of certainty required before a scheduled chemical is reported to the technical secretariat as present in the samples collected during an inspection of a chemical facility. The results of on-site and off-site analyses have to be considered separately.

The goal of on-site analysis is to support the verification of compliance with the treaty, i.e. to find out if there are any samples that need to be sent to two off-site laboratories for confirmatory analysis. Unambiguous identification is not required on-site, just an indication that scheduled chemicals might be present. On the other hand, the goal of off-site analysis is to obtain unambiguous confirmation of the analytical results obtained on-site. The scientists discussed whether unambiguous results are the only ones that should be reported by laboratories to the technical secretariat or whether tentative assignments, clearly marked as tentative, should also be released, to allow the secretariat to make the final identification. The group considered it imperative that the laboratories do the final identification themselves and report only those chemicals for which they have an unambiguous identification, i.e. a simple yes/no answer. In cases when the results from the two laboratories differ, the technical secretariat should

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send the samples for final evaluation to a third laboratory together with the analytical data from the two laboratories. The experts from the three laboratories together could then resolve the discrepancies.

The criteria for unambiguous identification were discussed at some length. There was consensus that two independent spectrometric techniques giving identical results are required. If the concentration of the sample is high enough, two different techniques such as mass spectrometry and infrared spectrometry or mass spectrometry and nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry are to be preferred over two similar techniques, such as two kinds of mass spectrometry.

In all the spectrometric methods, unambiguous identification requires that the analytical results be compared with reference data in a database or with data recorded from an authentic compound using the same individual instrument. The latter procedure involving authentic compounds was considered more reliable because the recorded and database spectra are likely to have been recorded under different conditions.

The present test highlighted the difficulties in identifying chemicals for which there are no earlier data or authentic compounds available. Preliminary identification has to be based on the interpretation of different types of spectra and final confirmation is obtained only after synthesis of the proposed chemical and recording of the identification data for purposes of comparison. In future, such a requirement for synthesis might delay the reporting of analytical results to the technical secretariat and, accordingly, underlines the need for as complete a database as possible at the earliest date after the convention has entered into force.

Unambiguous identification requires that the arrangement of atoms in the molecule be exactly known. The large number of isomeric chemicals in the octyl families made it impossible to determine the exact configuration of the octyl side chain. For purposes of verification, the scientists considered it sufficient to be able to report that octyl methylphosphonofluoridates were identified, without the need to report each of the fluoridates separately. Scientifically speaking this means that identifications were not unambiguous but that they were sufficient for the purpose, especially as the draft convention requires identification of alkyl methylphosphonofluoridates, not the exact structure of the alkyl moiety.

The results of the present test need to be evaluated in terms of success in identifying those samples that would have warranted transport to verification laboratories for more detailed analysis. The most important samples were those containing schedule 1 compounds and those containing methylphosphonates, especially the octyl derivatives. The only schedule 1 chemicals, the mixture of isomeric octyl methylphosphonofluoridates, were reported by only two laboratories, despite the availability of sophisticated in-house equipment. This was partly due to the degradation of the fluoridates during transport of the samples and partly due to the lack of reference data for these compounds. The degradation would of course have been avoided if the analysis had been performed on-site. Both the fluoridates and the

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methylphosphonates have specific ions in their mass spectra, most probably common to almost all members of the respective families, so they too would have been detected on-site.

The scientists considered the recommended operating procedures important for both on-site and off-site analyses and accordingly compiled procedures for the new sample matrices and analytical techniques. The need continuously to improve procedures, to meet the challenges of new developments in the analytical field, raised the idea of a "rolling text" for the recommended operating procedures.

The second round-robin test demonstrated the need to solve the problems associated with the transportation of samples. At present, the laboratory responsible for the preparation of samples is the only one that can give information on the toxicity of the samples with a view to finding the appropriate means of transportation. Rules acceptable for every Government should, therefore, be found for the transportation of test samples in order to facilitate the work of the future convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for a very interesting report on the second round-robin test, which has so many implications for the work of our CW Committee. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): It gives me particular pleasure that, for the first time, as representative of the new, democratic Romania, I address this august and unique United Nations body entrusted with the difficult but important task of negotiating agreements on disarmament.

My privilege is twofold. First, that I'm bringing here the irreversible options of Romania for democracy and market economy at home, for full openness, cooperation based on partnership and transparency in international affairs. Secondly, I'm joining you, distinguished and noted specialists, in your noble efforts for halting the arms race at a time when, due to the radical changes in human experience with respect to the fundamental importance of human rights and freedoms for the whole development of mankind, including security systems, important progress is also being achieved in the field of disarmament. I shall cooperate with you open-mindedly, free of any inhibition, either political or ideological, ready to share with you our concerns and perceptions.

Indeed, we witness profound mutations in the security situation in the world. Let's take only the recent disappearance of the Warsaw Treaty with all its consequences, political and military, and the legitimate concerns of Eastern European countries with respect to their security in the existing vacuum. In a period when we work intensively for building up an all-European cultural area, establishing a common human dimension and expanding economic integration, the necessity also arises to create a common Euro-Atlantic security system. We appreciate very much the opinion expressed by

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Mr. Manfred Wörner, Secretary-General of NATO, during his recent official visit to Bucharest, that Romania's security concerns, like the security concerns of other Eastern European countries, must be taken into consideration in any new arrangements in Europe.

Meantime, we consider that measures should be taken in order to avoid any exacerbation of the tension in some areas of Eastern Europe, including abstention from interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It will be of greatest importance to avoid especially the creation of opposing alliances. This is why Romania, pointing out the profound defensive and stabilizing character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, strongly advocates the undertaking of the obligation by all East European and other countries in Europe to refrain from concluding alliances directed against other countries on the continent.

These evolutions and changes also have a bearing on the methods of work and systems of consultations within our Conference, and we are called upon to address this matter too.

It is undeniable that important progress has been achieved in efforts to halt the arms race, reduce armaments and control the armaments drive, and that new and important agreements can be concluded in the field of disarmament. We highly praise in this respect the contributions of your great country, Mr. President, the United States of America, which open new vistas for our endeavours. With you chairing this Conference, we stand confident that we can succeed in attaining further progress in our work, first of all in putting the final touch on the chemical weapons convention.

The recent initiative of your country, presented personally by President George Bush, is unanimously appreciated as a real breakthrough for the solution of the remaining problems. This has already led to the emergence of a consensus on article I of the "rolling text", providing a more comprehensive character of the prohibition, which is applicable in any circumstances whatsoever.

Among the major remaining issues to be solved, verification is, of course, the most important. We share fully the view that verification is vital for assuring the efficiency of the convention. In such a way, States will be more assured that their security concerns are covered. Romania is ready to submit herself to any verification that meets with the agreement of the other States. Meantime, we understand the tremendous objective difficulties lying before us, and first of all before the experts who deal directly with this problem. Among other things, as has rightly been stressed during the debates, it is necessary to find an equilibrium between the necessity to prevent any violations of the undertaken obligations and the legitimate preoccupation to protect certain installations from improper intrusions that do not have any relation with the objective of the convention. We ourselves have such problems and are interested in balanced and efficient control.

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My country, which is unequivocally committed to the achievement of a total and comprehensive banning of chemical weapons, repeatedly declared in the last year and a half that it possessed no chemical weapons or had the means of producing them, nor the intention to acquire them. The Romanian Government wants to become an original party to the chemical weapons convention.

I am pleased to announce here today that as far as chemical weapons are concerned, and more specifically the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, the Romanian Parliament adopted last month a law on the withdrawal of the reservations made to the text of the Protocol a long time ago. This month, Romania officially notified France, as the depositary country, about the withdrawal of these reservations.

We support the proposal made by our Austrian colleague that countries which still have such reservations should withdraw them collectively and, in order to come to such an arrangement, a special meeting of the concerned countries be convened. We also share the view that this could be done during the envisaged ministerial meeting on chemical weapons.

One cannot appreciate more the efforts deployed by the United States and Soviet Union in order to conclude the INF Treaty permitting for the first time in history a destruction of arms, and these are nuclear delivery vehicles, one of the most destabilizing arms. The whole world and first of all European nations received with great satisfaction the news about the destruction of the last United States and Soviet land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. In the same sense mention should be made about the commitments undertaken by the Soviet Union and United States to unilaterally withdraw significant numbers of tactical nuclear warheads from the European region. Also, the ratification of the threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties gave hope that progress will also be obtained in the negotiations on the prohibition of all nuclear tests.

We welcome the imminent signature of the START treaty, which, as Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh appreciated, "is the most striking document ever elaborated in history, not to mention its size. It is a fantastically complex penetration into the heart of strategic balances and technologies".

The negotiated reductions and unilateral measures aimed at gradual elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe made possible significant progress in conventional disarmament on the continent as well. The CFE Treaty signed last year establishes a new military balance at a substantially lower level of armaments. In our view there are good conditions to continue this process and carry out, correctly and completely, the Paris Charter provisions on weapon reduction. A weapon-free Europe is still a utopian dream but a continent with less weapons represents an attainable objective. At the same time, openness and transparency, confidence-building measures in general are proven pace-setters for disarmament measures, as stipulated in the 1990 Vienna Document of the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures and the Paris Charter. Such measures could be envisaged not only in the

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frame of a multilateral document, but on a bilateral basis too. We have in mind the possibility of two neighbour countries to conclude agreements conceived as instruments aimed at increasing confidence and strengthening good-neighbourliness. The agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Hungary on the establishment of an "open skies" regime, signed on 11 May 1991 in Bucharest, stands for an application of this orientation. This agreement sets up an aerial surveillance regime under which unarmed aircraft of both parties are authorized to conduct observation flights above the territory of each other.

The Gulf crisis served to remind us of what consequences can ensue from the uncontrolled flow of weapons into unstable regions where tensions run high. The chief point of the problem of the massive accumulation of conventional weapons is not only their production, but their transfer between countries as well. Therefore we agree with the views expressed here that new ways should be developed to provide transparency in arms trade and restraint among suppliers and recipients. Lately, we noted widespread interest to conclude and implement effective arms control measures in this field. We support the proposal that the five permanent members of the Security Council, who are the principal arms exporters in the world, enter into discussions to establish guidelines on the restraint of conventional and other arms transfers.

The war in the Gulf has also demonstrated the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, the spread of nuclear weapons and of ballistic missiles, the related question of arms transfers and the arms trade. Constraining the supply and availability of weapons of mass destruction, and of the materials needed for their manufacture, should be a priority task. Such constraints would undoubtedly reduce the risks posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the ballistic missile systems that can deliver them. It is our belief that the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction and the commitment to their non-proliferation should also include missile technology.

Romania has been actively participating since the beginning of last year in the current multilateral efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. To this end, my Government expressed its readiness to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group and, as a result, last spring Romania was invited to take part in the work of this forum as a full member. In the same spirit my country decided to accept the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and to accede to this Group next autumn. We have close relations with the members of the Australia Group, working to increase the effectiveness of its control on chemical and biological materials.

In accordance with this new orientation of Romanian foreign policy, we support the latest United States Middle East arms control initiative and France's plan for global arms control and disarmament.

Romania welcomes the resumption of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the active participation in its debates. Much work is still ahead of us in order to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban regime which could be universally adhered to.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

Committed as it is to the aim of a complete test-ban treaty, Romania accepts the principle of reaching this objective gradually, in stages, on a step-by-step basis. The Romanian Government will welcome any agreement on further limitation of underground nuclear tests and any new step in this direction.

We noted with interest the considerable progress that has been made in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Romanian experts actively participate in the experiments that are presently taking place in this field. Now we received a new updated Swedish draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty so ably introduced by Ambassador Theorin. This text will have all the attention of my delegation.

We support all measures that have been agreed upon bilaterally or multilaterally to prevent the introduction of weapons and weapons systems in outer space. We appreciate the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has resumed its activity with a more targeted orientation. In the same spirit we commend the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons.

I conclude these few general remarks with the pledge that I shall do my best in order to make my share of contribution to the progress of the negotiations at the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to all the colleagues and specialists of the Conference, as well as those addressed to me and my country. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Mr. Robertson.

Mr. ROBERTSON (Canada): I would like to take the opportunity provided by this plenary to inform the representatives of both CD member States and participating non-members of a presentation that Canada will be making on Monday afternoon, 5 August, in connection with the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

Dr. Kin Yip Chun of the University of Toronto Geophysics Division has been conducting seismic research on behalf of our verification research programme. On the afternoon of Monday, 5 August, probably in room VII, he will present a layman's briefing, designed for non-experts, on certain aspects of his work, which will focus on further developments of seismic monitoring methodologies. That briefing will be immediately followed by a more detailed technical briefing for interested experts in the field of seismology who are here for the meeting of the GSE. We will also ask the secretariat to circulate a written invitation to delegations concerning Dr. Chun's presentation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for this information and we will look forward to the briefing, our attention to which he has called. With that statement we have concluded the list of those members inscribed for this morning.

(The President)

I would now take the initiative to call attention to the presence among us of the representative of India, Ambassador Chadha, who, as you know, will be leaving the Conference at the end of this month. As this is the last plenary that he will attend, I wish to convey to him on behalf of the Conference and myself our very best wishes for his future career and our most sincere appreciation for his contributions to the work of the Conference. In addition to having represented his country with distinction, Ambassador Chadha served this Conference as an elected leader and, given his well-known diplomatic skills and deep experience in multilateral organizations, it was not surprising that he discharged those responsibilities with distinction. His leadership and competence as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban are highly appreciated by all of us. Ambassador Chadha has expressed the wish to make a statement now and I therefore give him the floor.

Mr. CHADHA (India): Mr. President, may I begin by felicitating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference and by conveying to you my best wishes for a successful and fruitful term? We are confident that with your vast experience and diplomatic skills, you will be eminently successful in guiding our deliberations.

I wish to express my deep appreciation for the kind words that you have just addressed to me. It was indeed an enriching experience for me to be present during the work of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva at a time when new opportunities have been created in the field of disarmament by the far-reaching changes in East-West relations, the signature of the CFE Treaty in Europe and the announcement that the START Treaty between the United States and the USSR will be signed in the near future. We also saw a new momentum in the chemical weapons negotiations at Geneva, which may indeed lead to the completion of these negotiations in the near future.

As I approach the end of my tour of duty at Geneva, I would like to say a few words regarding my impressions of the work relating to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which, as you have just recalled, Mr. President, I had the honour to chair this year. The Ad Hoc Committee, as we are all aware, was set up after a gap of seven years for a brief period last year and was re-established this year with a non-negotiating mandate. This was made possible by the spirit of compromise shown by all. The underlying expectation was that the deliberations in the Committee would prepare the ground for the eventual conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. We proceeded with our task by identifying four major topics for discussion this year. These were taken up in two clusters, viz., (i) structure and scope, and (ii) verification and compliance. In the course of the next couple of weeks, the Committee will be further enriched by interaction with representatives of the Group of Scientific Experts. The quality of the debate was extremely high; which was indicative of the interest of delegations in the issue of a nuclear test ban. Personally, I received full cooperation from the bureau members and other delegations in the conduct of these deliberations, for which I am most grateful. It would be remiss of me not to mention the extremely competent work put in by the secretariat; and the interpreters, who had to deal with some complex terminologies.

(Mr. Chadha, India)

The exchange of views in the Committee brought out the universal recognition of the importance of the multilateral consideration of the question. The need for the Committee to be provided with a negotiating mandate continues to be underlined by most delegations. The view has also been expressed that all nuclear-weapon States must participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. While there was general acceptance of the final goal of a nuclear test ban, differences still remain on its timing and modalities. It was recognized that the achievement of a comprehensive test ban is only a partial measure in the overall goal of complete nuclear disarmament and that its importance cannot be belittled in this context. There is no doubt that a global nuclear-test-ban treaty would stem proliferation both vertically and horizontally and this would be a genuine non-proliferation measure. It was pointed out during the discussions that while a comprehensive test ban was desirable, even a one-kiloton ceiling on tests could seriously curtail the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. This lends credence to the view that a nuclear-test-ban treaty has to be achieved quickly, lest the problems of verification become intractable. As far as verification is concerned, though there has been a widely held view that seismic methods would be adequate to detect and identify major underground nuclear explosions, it has been pointed out that an acceptable level of certainty and compliance could be achieved by looking at other methods as well; such as measurement of radiation, satellite monitoring, acoustic methods, on-site inspections and other relevant measures. The work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been widely commended. It has been stated that the overall technical work of the Group should be seen in the political context and the guidance of the Ad Hoc Committee is essential in this respect. In this context, many delegations held the view that the GSE should be given clear and precise future tasks as quickly as possible.

The Committee also benefited from a number of concrete proposals on verification as well as on the structure of the future nuclear-test-ban treaty. The contribution of Sweden, which was made today, will further enrich the Committee's work. A nuclear test ban is more easily verifiable than most other disarmament measures. However, a decision whether or not to go ahead with the treaty would not be based only on this consideration. It would be essentially a political decision based on governmental calculations of national security and international stability. It is important that such a decision, which would help save resources needed for peaceful purposes, diminish the dangers to the environment and improve the international political climate, leading further to other disarmament measures, is taken at the earliest possible time. It is my hope that the report of the Ad Hoc Committee this year will identify specific issues for future work. It is important that delegations concentrate on a list of priorities in order to sustain an interest in this item next year and beyond. It is my experience that delegations have already shown flexibility in this regard and this should not pose insurmountable problems. I intend to hold further consultations in the course of today on this important question.

The present international situation offers adequate opportunities for the Conference on Disarmament to live up to its reputation as the single multilateral negotiating forum. The conclusion of a chemical weapons

(Mr. Chadha, India)

convention in the near future would certainly be a shot in the arm for this body. Although I have some regrets that I will not be here when this convention is finalized, I can assure you that the Indian delegation will continue to cooperate fully with other delegations at the CD in order to fulfil our important task. I wish to thank all delegations once again for their cooperation. I am also grateful to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and his able deputy, Ambassador Berasategui, with whom I have had a long association, the other members of the secretariat for their support and encouragement, and finally wish the Conference on Disarmament well in the accomplishment of its tasks.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement, and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

If there is no other delegation wishing to take the floor, I shall proceed to other business. I see none.

The Conference has before it working paper CD/WP.408, relating to a request from Malta to participate in the work of the Conference at plenary meetings and in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I gained the impression at presidential consultations yesterday that there was no objection to that request. This being the case, I would think there is no need to hold an informal meeting to consider it, on the understanding that this does not set a precedent for the consideration of other requests. Shall I take it that the Conference agrees to the draft decision?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The Permanent Mission of Malta will be informed accordingly.

The secretariat has circulated today the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. You will notice that the Seismic Group will begin its thirty-second session on Monday, at 11 a.m., in conference room VII. As we are approaching the last month of work of the Conference, I appeal to all members to be available to start our meetings on time, so that we can fully utilize the resources available to us. This applies in particular to those meetings being held consecutively, and thus the utmost punctuality is required. Of course, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. On this understanding, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the informal paper.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today, but before adjourning this plenary meeting, I wish to remind you all that the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", immediately following this. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 1 August, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.600
1 August 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDREDTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 1 August 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Stephen J. Ledogar (United States of America)

GE.91-62125/3497B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 600th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset I wish to convey to the representative of Switzerland, on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament and myself as President, our warmest congratulations on the 700th anniversary of the Swiss Confederation. I hardly need stress the important role that Switzerland has played and continues to play in international affairs. Its reputation as the centre for sensitive negotiations on major issues facing the international community is well known, not only to us diplomats but to international public opinion at large. This important role has been further strengthened by a tradition which has rendered great contributions in the field of international humanitarian law and by the involvement of Swiss institutions in relief work for those suffering in regions devastated by the ravages of war and natural catastrophes. It is certainly not by chance that Switzerland is the host to a number of organizations in the United Nations system, and also to this Conference, to which it has been contributing effectively. May I ask the representative of Switzerland to transmit to his Government our best wishes on this historic commemorative day?

I should now like to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference to the new representative of Indonesia, Soemadi Brotodiningrat, who is attending this plenary meeting. In doing so, I wish to pledge to him the continuing cooperation of my delegation with his own in the activities of the Conference. I am sure that we shall have in him a colleague who will carry on the good work done by his predecessor.

I also note today the presence of the participants in the 1991 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme, who will be following our work as part of their activities. We all wish them success in their endeavours.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of France and Pakistan. At the end of that list I shall also make a short statement as representative of the United States of America, as will the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to address to you my warmest congratulations on taking up the office of President of our Conference. We can all gauge the authority, the high ideals and the effectiveness with which you have been conducting our work. I am also pleased to be speaking following the signing between the United States and the Soviet Union of a disarmament agreement which my Government, like many others, has hailed as a historic event, and on which my delegation will have occasion to make its views known in the near future. I also wish to address my heartiest congratulations to the representative of Switzerland upon the national holiday of his country, which this year marks the 700th anniversary of the Confederation. Lastly, I also wish to greet and extend a welcome to our new colleague from Indonesia.

(Mr. Errera, France)

I have asked for the floor today in order to introduce a working paper (distributed under number CD/1092) relating to the prevention of an arms race in space. In its recent arms control and disarmament plan which I had occasion to present here on 6 June last, France proposed the development of a regime of confidence-building measures in space, in particular in the form of a "code of conduct in space" applicable to civilian and military satellites. The subject of course is not a new one. It has already been discussed within the Conference, and in particular in its Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, where numerous proposals have been put forward since 1985, in particular by the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Australia, Poland, the Soviet Union and Argentina. This work demonstrated that this subject was the focus of growing interest and support. Each of us is aware of the difficulties involved in a total prohibition of the deployment of arms in space. How does one define these arms, for example, and above all how does one verify such a prohibition?

On the other hand, by means of confidence-building measures - the development of registration and rules of behaviour - the purpose is to enhance the security of space activities by preventing any aggressive use of space. Experience acquired on Earth does indeed demonstrate that the implementation of confidence-building and security-building measures can constitute a fundamental stage leading subsequently to disarmament. This action, in our view, would not only be in keeping with the interests of all space Powers, but would contribute to ensuring international stability and help to permit development in space cooperation for civilian and scientific purposes, in the interests of all States, in conformity with the spirit of the 1967 outer space Treaty. That is why, among all the topics under discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, France is convinced that it is confidence-building measures which offer the best prospects for the near future.

France also proposed, in its disarmament plan of 3 June, the creation of regional agencies responsible for transparency, which would benefit from access to satellite images in the context of regional agreements on confidence and security. The usefulness of data derived from space observation in the monitoring of disarmament agreements or crisis management needs no further demonstration. Moreover, the international community increasingly recognizes the need for a regional approach to security and disarmament. France is therefore ready, for its part, to make a contribution to the establishment of such agencies, in particular through the training of specialists in photo-interpretation, the definition of reception facilities which could be made available to such agencies, and cooperation with other producers of space images to supply the agencies with the data needed for their operations.

The working paper submitted by my delegation provides further details of these various proposals. It will also be the subject of a more elaborate presentation by an expert from the National Centre for Space Studies, Mr. Pierre-Henri Pisani, at the next meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space on 6 August next. I hope that this contribution will make it possible for the Committee to move forward in its work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): In my statement today I propose to address some aspects of the future chemical weapons convention, an important subject to which the Conference on Disarmament continues to devote by far the greatest amount of its time.

Allow me to reiterate, at the very outset, our perception of what the chemical weapons convention should encompass. We support a comprehensive, effective and equitable treaty which prohibits the development, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and which provides for the total destruction of existing stockpiles, production facilities and delivery systems of chemical weapons. A convention which contains anything less than these fundamental provisions would not enjoy universal support, and this would undermine the basic concept of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Let me also state once again for the record that Pakistan neither possesses chemical weapons nor desires to acquire them, and that it will continue to actively and positively contribute towards the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

The impetus that has been provided to our negotiations by the recent change in the United States position is timely, and we welcome it. In fact, it has made it possible for us to refine article I, which for the first time now clearly spells out the prohibition of use in a straight-forward manner. If we continue our work in the same spirit in the coming months, and show due regard for the views of all negotiating partners, there is no reason why a convention cannot be concluded by the end of 1992 as has already been resolved by us.

Confidence in compliance with the future chemical weapons convention lies at the heart of our negotiations. It would be too simplistic to build a vitally important disarmament convention only on the premise that States parties would adhere to it in good faith, and with the intention of abiding by its provisions. Provisions relating to verification and compliance will consequently have to establish a system which ensures that treaty obligations are being strictly observed. While 100 per cent effective compliance machinery does not appear within the realm of the possible, our endeavour is to create an equitable and efficacious verification system which maximizes confidence in the treaty provisions. It is obvious that the type and intrusiveness of verification to which an activity would be subjected should be determined by the element of risk which that particular activity poses for the convention.

The verification regime which we have been developing for the convention consists of two main elements, namely routine inspection under article VI and challenge inspection under article IX. I shall address these articles separately.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

The importance of verification under article VI is undeniable. Unlike the provisions in the convention concerning destruction, which will apply only to chemical-weapon States, and which will hopefully become obsolete after the 10-year destruction period during which stocks and production facilities would be eliminated, the monitoring regime for activities not prohibited under the convention will be of unlimited duration and of direct interest to a considerably larger number of States. In this context we have addressed the question of clandestine production in facilities which are normally devoted to peaceful purposes but which could be converted to the production of chemicals posing a risk to the objectives of the convention. In developing a regime to address these concerns we must ensure that it is as non-intrusive as possible, while at the same time being as cost-effective as possible. We are not in favour of a system which places unnecessary hindrances on the civilian chemical industry, and in which certain elements of the challenge inspection procedure are sought to be injected. Continued insistence on the inclusion of such concepts are liable to result in the unnecessary politicization of an activity which is intrinsically routine in nature.

The provisions of article IX on challenge inspection will have a central place in the proposed convention, both as a means of providing confidence in its implementation and in order to deter potential violations. To be effective these procedures will have to be expeditious, non-discriminatory and mandatory. Although these principles now seem to be generally accepted, the task of translating them into agreed procedures has not been easy. Numerous proposals have been put forward, but success has eluded us so far. The working paper introduced by four delegations recently is a brave and positive attempt to break the deadlock on this issue, and we have noted that in its effort to accommodate many of the concerns that have been expressed in the Ad hoc Committee by various delegations, it has departed from some concepts which until now had been considered as sacrosanct and non-negotiable.

On this subject of challenge inspection, I would like to state once again some of the ideas which my delegation has expressed in the past, and continues to favour. Critically important among these is the imperative need for including clear conditions which prevent abuse of challenge inspection procedures, and which ensure the legitimate right of States, and particularly smaller States, to protect and safeguard sensitive information and installations which are not relevant to the convention. Additionally, once a challenge inspection is launched, it becomes a subject of concern to the States parties, and can no longer be treated as a bilateral affair between the challenging State and the challenged State: the primary responsibility of carrying out the inspection is that of the technical secretariat. The role of the observer still needs to be clearly defined, taking care not to make him into an "inspector of inspectors". And finally, irrespective of the subjective assessments of the parties concerned, once an inspection is completed, a clear determination on compliance or otherwise should be arrived at by the executive council. Failure to include such a provision in the convention would perpetuate a climate of distrust, and undermine confidence in the verification procedures.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

Articles X and XI of the convention are of special importance for the developing countries. My delegation has taken a particular interest in the development of the provisions for these articles, and we are happy to see that agreement has finally been reached in the Ad Hoc Committee to enhance their status by placing them in appendix I. This is indeed an important and overdue breakthrough, though some additional work is required yet to further refine their provisions. The viability and universality of the convention will depend, to a great extent, on the final shape these articles acquire before negotiations are concluded.

Even though the text of article X is fairly well developed, our perception of what it should encompass bears repetition. Firstly, an article which does not assure mandatory assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons will lead to an unbalanced convention. Secondly, the system that is established under this article for the provision of assistance should have an automaticity and predictability about it, of the type of automaticity and predictability that is being sought for the verification mechanisms, for the two directly complement each other. Thirdly and finally, a system of assistance and protection will have no meaning without the actual availability of adequate resources with the Director General, which enable him to provide assistance and protection in case of need, and most particularly in cases requiring emergency assistance.

The language of article XI was developed some years ago and will have to be refined to reflect existing realities. In our view, the provisions of this article should incorporate the obligation of States parties not to impede international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemical science and technology, and an undertaking that existing discriminatory mechanisms will be dismantled once the convention comes into force. As in the case of the suggestion that has been repeatedly heard in this forum, calling on all States to declare their intention to adhere to a future convention even while its text is still under negotiation, perhaps member States who, individually or collectively, apply export controls and restrictions on the transfer of certain chemicals may consider declaring their intention to dismantle these measures for the States who signed the future chemical weapons convention. Simultaneously, as suggested by Austria and supported by other States, member States who have entered reservations to the Geneva Protocol might also consider announcing their intention to withdraw their reservations once the convention comes into force. Such gestures would promote confidence in the convention, and contribute to the objective of its universality, to which we are all committed.

The composition, powers and functions of the executive council are outstanding and thorny issues, and we hope that they will be addressed in an appropriate setting during the current session of the Ad Hoc Committee. Our past discussions have helped us to identify most of the issues and options already. What is now required is the will to strike a compromise which should be realistic and equitable.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

We share the view expressed by a majority of delegations that the executive council should consist of between about 25 and 30 members. At the same time we also believe that the convention should contain provision for the expansion of the executive council in the future, if the situation so warrants.

While choosing a system for the allocation of seats, a balance has to be struck between the undeniable interests of those States which have substantial chemical industries many of which will either be directly concerned by the convention or whose cooperation will be essential, the equally undeniable interests of those States which are situated in particularly sensitive regions or who have specific threat perceptions, and the overall and overriding need for a democratic and regionally representative membership. However, some flexibility will be necessary so that no one of these three legitimacies overwhelms the other two, and so that the membership of this vital organ does not take on a colour that prejudges its decisions. We think a formula can be found, provided there is general agreement on the need for compromise and adjustment between these three types of interest.

We are now in a stage of intense and intensified work, when many factors lead us to believe that meaningful results can be achieved in negotiating and drafting a convention which will be comprehensive and fair, and which will then draw the type of universal adherence which we all seek. Let none of us be found wanting in far-sighted statesmanship now when the glimmer of success is in sight, and when we all see the positive and early possibility of outlawing an entire type of abhorrent weapon from our global community.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement. As I now have no other previously inscribed speakers on my list, I shall now proceed with my own statement. I see now and recognize the representative of Germany, Ambassador von Wagner.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany): Mr. President, forgive me for asking for the floor without being inscribed on your list. I take the floor to announce the following.

The German delegation has pleasure in informing you about a technical presentation on "Lessons learnt from GSETT-2: A proposal for an open seismic stations concept" by the German representatives to the GSE, Prof. Dr. Harjes and Mr. Henger. In this presentation, an alternative to the currently used concept of national and international data centres for the verification of a future NTB will be suggested. The open seismic station concept would result in significant advantages, such as immediate and unhindered access to seismic wave-form data by all participants at any time; retrieval of data on a need-to-know basis, thus reducing the requirements for communications; and, finally, costs for data transmission will be lowered considerably.

The presentation will take place at 3 p.m. on 7 August 1991 in room XVI on the fifth floor of the Palais des Nations, and it will be followed by a reception in the Delegates' Restaurant on the eighth floor of the same Palais. The German delegation would be highly honoured if delegations could find time to attend the presentation and to take part in the reception in the Delegates' Restaurant.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Germany for his statement, and we will take due note of the information he has kindly provided.

I would now proceed with the brief statements by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As was already noted by the representative of France, yesterday a historic agreement, the Treaty on strategic arms reductions or the START Treaty, was signed in Moscow by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. That signing ceremony culminated nine years of hard work here in Geneva, and represented a major achievement in securing a more stable, predictable balance at lower levels of strategic nuclear forces.

Once ratified, the START Treaty will reduce, over seven years, each side's strategic nuclear weapons from their current levels of between 10,000 and 11,000 weapons to between 8,000 and 9,000 weapons. The agreement includes a major reduction in the most destabilizing and dangerous weapons - namely, land-based ballistic missiles and their warheads - and it places restrictions on specific types of strategic weapons. The Treaty embodies the concepts of equality, stability, predictability, deep reductions, and transparency.

Perhaps the most important aspect of this Treaty is its contribution to increasing predictability and transparency. A protocol containing over 80 different types of notifications will help both sides understand the strategic military activities of the other side. Twelve different forms of inspections and the permanent monitoring of certain ballistic missile production in each country will provide firm assurances that Treaty obligations are being met. The Treaty will have a duration of 15 years, unless superseded beforehand by a subsequent agreement.

At a future date, we would plan to introduce the basic text of the START Treaty into this body as a CD document.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, I should now like to convey greetings to the representative of Switzerland, Ambassador von Arx, and the members of his delegation, on the occasion of the 700th anniversary of the Swiss Confederation. This is an important landmark in the history of a country which is playing a very positive role in the European and world processes. We value not only the traditional Swiss hospitality, which ensures excellent conditions in particular for the work of a whole range of the most important international organizations, including the Conference on Disarmament, but also the specific constructive contribution made by the Swiss Government to the settlement of problems facing the world community. On behalf of the Soviet delegation and personally, I should like on this day to wish our Swiss colleagues every success, health and happiness, and I would request them to transmit our sincere congratulations and best wishes to the Swiss Government.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

I would also wish to offer greetings to our distinguished President, Ambassador Ledogar, who is conducting the proceedings of the Conference in a highly worthy manner, and also to express confidence that during his tenure as President we will achieve concrete results in the solution of tasks facing the Conference.

Today, as the representative of a State - one of the two States - participating in the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations, which culminated yesterday in the signing of the historic Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, I wish to say a few words in connection with that event, without repeating what has just been stated by Ambassador Ledogar. The Treaty signed by our Presidents is the result of many years of efforts, a great deal of work and patience, will-power and boldness, demanded of statesmen, diplomats and the military, as well as the overcoming of stereotyped ideas concerning each other which on occasion appeared to be tougher than gun-metal. The Treaty symbolizes the continuation of the voluntary reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States of America, which is unprecedented in scale and purpose and offers unequivocal proof of the resolve of both sides to discharge their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Together with the Treaty on the elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, it imparts to the dismantling of the infrastructure of nuclear confrontation which was built up during the years of the "cold war" a momentum which it will be difficult to halt. It is important that now there is growing understanding of the absurdity of an overarmed world, especially when mankind has moved towards an era of economic interdependence. To be sure the Treaty is not ideal, and we cannot exclude the possibility that certain provisions contained in it will be criticized. Many, perhaps, may say that the reductions provided for are not sufficient. However, we are convinced that the parties have done everything that is possible at this stage and at the same time necessary for further movement forward. It is important that we have built a basis for further stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive armaments, and the resolve of the parties to move forward in this direction has been placed on record, inter alia in the Soviet-American statement of 1 June 1990.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I would now ask whether any other representative wishes to address the plenary today. I see that the representative of Switzerland wishes to take the floor. You have the floor, Ambassador von Arx.

Mr. von ARX (Switzerland) (translated from French): As this is the first time that I am taking the floor in this plenary, Mr. President, I wish to extend my warm congratulations to you on your task that is so full of responsibilities and dignity. The delegation of Switzerland is convinced that under your guidance, and that of your predecessors, we will make significant steps towards our common goal, and we are indebted to you and all those who preceded you for all your endeavours. I would like to assure you of the constructive cooperation of the delegation of Switzerland. On this occasion also I wish to welcome our new colleague from Indonesia.

(Mr. von ARX, Switzerland)

You, Mr. President, as well as the representatives of France and the Soviet Union, were kind enough this morning, on our national day, to convey dignified and friendly words of congratulation to my delegation and my country on the occasion of its 700th anniversary. We are very grateful to you and I must say how moved we were at your words. I shall without fail convey this to my authorities. Seven hundred years of existence of a small State in the midst of Europe which is often so turbulent - are there any lessons to be drawn from this, any experience to be gained that might perhaps be helpful to us too in our work which is so important here in the Conference on Disarmament?

Perhaps one first point. Our Confoederatio Helvetica did not drop out of the sky, and it is never quite complete. It was created 700 years ago by the firm political will of three small mountain States in the centre of our country, and that political will to expand that State, even by entities with different cultures, different languages or religions, was necessary throughout the 700 years and will be necessary too in the future. Let us recall the fact that the most recent canton in our country, the canton of Jura, was established not quite 20 years ago, when the canton of Jura separated from the canton of Berne in keeping with the wishes of its population and acceptance by the people of Berne and all of Switzerland. Our country is and remains based on that political will which must be elaborated on, maintained, developed, day by day, year by year. What ideas can we draw from this to assist us in our work? That we too must continue our political work day after day without giving up courage and confidence, and that, even if we have attained intermediate goals, however extraordinarily important, our work will not be finished.

A further point. Only roughly 150 years ago, my country was one of the poorest countries in Europe. Karl Marx, when he made an extended trip to Switzerland, ended by drawing conclusions concerning what he had seen and studied. His verdict was that, given the geographical circumstances - just rocks, a few pastures and a few cows, and the absence of raw materials - Switzerland would forever remain a poor State. If you compare that with the development of my country since then, we can perhaps draw two conclusions. First of all, that even great minds can make mistakes, and secondly that even things that appear to be impossible can be realized. That too can guide us in our work and give us courage.

With these few thoughts I would like to conclude, thanking you all once again for your warm congratulations. The Swiss delegation is pleased to invite you all this evening to our 700th anniversary at the Domaine de Penthes.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Switzerland, and also for the kind words addressed to the Chair, and we look forward to his hospitality this evening. I see that the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Brotodiningrat, wishes to take the floor.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia): May I first congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament? I would also like to felicitate the delegation of Switzerland, which today celebrates the 700th anniversary of its beautiful country.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

May I take the opportunity just to express my most sincere thanks and appreciation for your kind words of welcome you have just addressed to me? Being just a beginner, it would be pretentious for me to promise you a substantial contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, but it would certainly be most appropriate for my delegation to pledge to you its full cooperation in the discharge of your demanding task. Let me at this point just reiterate the utmost importance that my Government attaches to disarmament in general and to the work of the CD in particular. Once again, Mr. President, thank you very much for the welcome.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Sir, and I hope that your tour here will be long enough that you can make it around to this seat before you leave.

May I now turn to other business? First of all, the secretariat has circulated today the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies to be held next week. As usual, the timetable is only indicative and may be changed if necessary. On this understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Next, I would like to recall that, in the context of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, there will be a number of activities. I have asked the secretariat to circulate the text of a communication addressed to me by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Dr. Ola Dahlman, concerning a technical demonstration of Inmarsat's satellite transmission capability. That letter will also be circulated this afternoon in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, for its information. The technical demonstration will be held on 8 August at 3 p.m. in the Salon de Genève, Delegates' Restaurant, on the eighth floor. We were also informed by the representative of Canada, at our last plenary meeting, that on Monday 5 August, Dr. Kin Yip Chun will present a layman's briefing on certain aspects of his work, which will focus on further developments of seismic monitoring methodologies. That briefing will take place in room VII at 3 p.m. As announced today by the representative of Germany, his delegation is inviting all members and non-members to a technical demonstration of an "open seismic CD station", to take place on Wednesday 7 August, at 3 p.m. in room XVI.

I have no other business for today. Before I adjourn, I should like to recall that, immediately following this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold its last informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2. As announced on several occasions, with that meeting the Conference shall conclude its series of informal meetings on agenda items 2 and 3. Of course, in accordance with the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may continue to address these agenda items at plenary meetings of the Conference.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held one week from today, on Thursday 8 August, at 10. a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.601
8 August 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 8 August 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Stephen J. Ledogar (United States of America)

GE.91-62194/3569B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 601st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I would like to bid farewell, on behalf of the Conference and myself, to two distinguished friends and colleagues who are today attending the plenary for the last time before they assume new functions assigned to them by their Governments. I take particular pleasure in doing so, as they are both being appointed to serve in different capacities in my own country. During his brief but able tenure as representative of Brazil to this Conference, Ambassador Ricupero has confirmed once more his reputation in Geneva as a skilful and competent diplomat. He has now been entrusted with the responsibility of representing his country before my own Government in Washington. Relations between Brazil and the United States have always been excellent, and I cannot think of a more appropriate interlocutor to further strengthen those relations. Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt is a very experienced diplomat in the field of disarmament, having also served with distinction in the predecessor of this body, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. A gifted professional, during his four years with this Conference everyone has come to value his talent for persuasion and his knowledge of the complexities of multilateral diplomacy. This will, I am sure, serve him well in his new functions. Although he will not be dealing with bilateral relations, while in New York he will be a welcome and appreciated guest of the United States. On behalf of all of us I wish our two colleagues every success in their new postings.

The representative of Brazil, Ambassador Ricupero, has asked to say a few words at this point and, if there is no objection from the listed speakers, I would give him the floor at this time. Ambassador, you have the floor.

Mr. RICUPERO (Brazil): Mr. President, with your permission and the permission of the other speakers, I would like to have the privilege of taking the floor right away because unfortunately I have to leave shortly, so to my great regret I cannot stay until the end of the proceedings. I was deeply moved by your words, Mr. President, and it gives me particular satisfaction to hear them from you, the representative of the United States of America, a country where in a few weeks I will have the honour of representing my own country, Brazil, going back to the post where I served about 15 or 18 years ago. I would also like to express my feelings of deep gratitude to yourself and to all our colleagues for the numerous signs of friendship, of sympathy, of cooperation, extended to me during my work here in the Conference. I have greatly benefited from your wisdom, from your experience, and I am sorry to leave the Conference at this moment, at this turning-point in international affairs when things are moving everywhere, where I am sure that the Conference on Disarmament will have its share of historical progress - I am sure you will make good use of the opportunity that is opening before us. I would like once again to thank you all, to wish you all well in your endeavours.

The PRESIDENT: I have on my list of speakers today, the representatives of Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Egypt, Argentina, Romania and Morocco. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Mr. Przygodzki.

Mr. PRZYGODZKI (Poland): My delegation has already had a chance to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the assumption of your responsible duties. Today, as the term of your presidency is going to be completed soon, I should like to express our deep appreciation for the exemplary way you have guided the deliberations of this body and for your personal input to the work of the Conference.

I wish to join you, Mr. President, in saying words of farewell to the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil and to the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt. The Polish delegation highly appreciated the cooperation with them and the important contribution they made to the work of this Conference. We wish them well in their future careers and personal lives.

I wish to express the deep satisfaction of my Government with the signing last week by President George Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev of the strategic arms reduction Treaty. I should like to convey to you, Mr. President, as the representative of the United States, as well as to the representative of the USSR, our warmest congratulations on this historic event. We highly appreciate the efforts which have been made both by your country, Mr. President, and by the Soviet Union in overcoming all the difficulties and obstacles on the road to concluding the START Treaty. This is indeed good news for the whole of mankind, and also for this body, which has the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament high on its agenda. The START Treaty, being the first commitment of both States to cut significantly the arsenals of long-range nuclear weapons, including, in particular, the most destabilizing systems of such weapons, will undoubtedly stand as a milestone on the way towards a more secure world. I do hope that in a near future we negotiators in Geneva will be able to make our own contribution to disarmament efforts by successfully completing negotiations on the chemical weapons convention.

In our last statement at the Conference on Disarmament my delegation promised to present a report on a trial inspection on request conducted at some Soviet military facilities on Polish territory. Poland initiated preparations for such an inspection at the beginning of this year. However, at that time our initiative did not materialize. Today I would like to introduce a joint report on behalf of the Republic of Poland and the USSR on the trial inspection on request conducted by Poland at two Soviet military facilities located on the territory of my country on 17 and 18 April 1991. The detailed report on the conduct of this inspection and its results is tabled as document CD/1093 (working paper CD/CW/WP.354).

The principal aims of this inspection were, first, to confirm, in so far as Poland's territory is concerned, the USSR declaration on non-possession of chemical weapons outside its territory; and second, to test relevant procedures of the "rolling text" in practice and to train inspectors in carrying out such inspections. In view of the twofold character of this inspection certain procedural elements were properly adjusted without

(Mr. Przygodzki, Poland)

prejudice to relevant provisions under the convention. At the same time activities of inspectors were carried out pursuant to a bilateral protocol agreed between Poland and the USSR based on the preceding version of the "rolling text" (CD/1033).

The facilities inspected during this inspection on request were selected by the Polish side. The first was a central artillery depot of the Soviet troops, the second a central chemical depot, both located on the territory of Poland. The different nature of each of these facilities required different approaches to the conduct of the inspection. In the latter case the inspection team inspected the entire depot, while at the first facility it was possible to limit the inspection to just a part of it. In both cases conclusions were identical: no chemical weapons or their traces were discovered.

I would like to note with appreciation the full cooperation of the Soviet authorities and the management of the inspected facilities at all stages of the inspection. The inspection team had full access to all places selected by it, as well as to all documentation. This played an important role as a confidence-building measure at a time when relations between Poland and the USSR are being developed on a qualitatively new basis.

The experience gained during the exercise confirmed that inspection on request constitutes an indispensable element of the effective verification of compliance with the convention. The extent of cooperation by the inspected State with the inspection team will play a great role in dispelling concern about treaty compliance and terminating an inspection at an earlier stage when sufficient evidence is obtained that doubts or suspicion giving rise to the request were unwarranted. A request for inspection should, to the extent possible, clearly identify the nature of suspicion. This would considerably facilitate the task of the technical secretariat to select inspectors with appropriate qualifications and suitable equipment to fulfil the aims of the inspection.

In view of the importance of inspections on request in the verification system of the future chemical weapons convention, my delegation welcomes all efforts to find a final solution to this very important issue in our negotiations. Working paper CD/CW/WP.352 constitutes, in our view, a good basis for further work on article IX. We do believe that an agreement on the final shape of inspection on request will enable us to make progress on all other outstanding issues, thus contributing to the attainment of our common goal - completing negotiations on the chemical weapons convention by 1992. My delegation is ready to contribute its share in this endeavour.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the joint report he introduced, and I also thank him for the kind words addressed to the Chair and to the arms control and disarmament efforts of my Government. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Iossifov.

Mr. IOSSIFOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): On behalf of the Soviet delegation I too wish to express our appreciation and gratitude to the distinguished Ambassadors of Brazil and Egypt for their contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and for their cooperation with the Soviet delegation. We wish them success in their future endeavours.

Today the Soviet delegation jointly with the delegation of the Republic of Poland is introducing for consideration by the participants in the negotiations a document entitled "Joint report on a trial inspection on request", which is being circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament numbered CD/1093 and dated 6 August 1991, and at the same time as a working paper of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under number CD/CW/WP.354. In terms of timing the introduction of this document has coincided with the stepping up of the discussion on inspections on request in the negotiations, and we hope that the submitted material will facilitate the search for a mutually acceptable solution to this problem.

As the participants in the negotiations are aware, the Soviet Union has officially declared that it has no chemical weapons on the territory of other States (CD/CW/WP.264). The Republic of Poland, which has also submitted data related to chemical weapons to the Conference on Disarmament, has declared, inter alia, that it does not possess chemical weapons (CD/985). With a view to strengthening mutual understanding and trust between the two sides, the Soviet Union and Poland agreed to carry out a trial inspection on request. The trial inspection had the following aims: to confirm, in so far as Poland's territory is concerned, the USSR declaration on non-possession of chemical weapons outside its territory; to test in practice the relevant procedures of the protocol on inspection procedures contained in the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons to be used in checking the suspected storage of chemical weapons; to determine the necessary scope of activities which should be carried out by the inspection team during an inspection on request at military facilities; and lastly to train inspectors in carrying out such inspections.

The trial inspection was carried out during the period from 17 to 18 April 1991 at two Soviet military facilities located on Polish territory. The facilities to be inspected were selected by the Polish side. The inspection was carried out at the central artillery depot, where different types of artillery munitions are stored, and at the central chemical depot, where gear for protection against weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, are stored. On the basis of the results of the inspection it was concluded that no chemical weapons or traces of such weapons are present at the inspected facilities. Overall the experiment demonstrated that it is important and essential to include a concept of inspections on request in the verification mechanism under the future convention as a basic element for ensuring compliance with the provisions of the convention and dispelling possible concerns on the part of the future States parties with regard to such compliance.

(Mr. Iossifov, USSR)

Allow me now to dwell in a little more detail on certain aspects of the trial inspection which are of direct relevance to the issues in the context of inspections on request currently under discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. First, it should be noted, in our view, that the inspection team was granted access to any place within the inspected facilities. During the inspection there were no cases of refusal to grant any requests for access. Another aspect is related to the time elapsing between the submission of the request for the inspection and the granting of access to the facilities indicated in the request. The request was submitted 16 hours prior to the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry. Access to the first facility was provided within two hours after arrival at the point of entry. The notification of the second facility to be inspected was presented 15 hours prior to the arrival of the inspection team at the facility. During the inspection agreed equipment was used.

Naturally, the results of this inspection on request do not claim to be regarded as universal, but we hope that their joint presentation by the Soviet and Polish delegations will help the participants in the negotiations to finalize their approach to this form of verification.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement, which also spoke of the joint report addressed by the representative of Poland. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): It is a source of great pleasure for me to take the floor under the presidency of Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, the distinguished representative of the United States. Your wide and highly recognized diplomatic experience, Mr. President, is well known to all the members of the Conference on Disarmament. Your contributions in the field of disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral, are well recognized. I am confident that under your very able leadership meaningful progress in our work will be attained. Mr. President, I was personally touched by the gracious sentiments you expressed regarding my departure from Geneva and the assumption of my new post in New York, and I am grateful for that.

I shall at the outset address the chemical weapons convention. I begin by paying tribute to the efforts of Ambassador Serguei Batsanov of the Soviet Union, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and the three chairmen of the working groups entrusted with the preparation of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as the Friends of the Chair. My delegation's gratitude also goes to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail and his able assistants for their meticulous work.

The spectre of the production and use of chemical weapons has caused universal concern. There is no doubt that a comprehensive treaty banning chemical weapons is the appropriate framework to deal with the question. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons established by the Conference on Disarmament is closely followed now by the international community as a whole. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is at present

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

undertaking consultations on an extensive programme of work for the remainder of 1991 and the beginning of 1992. Whatever the outcome of his consultations, I wish to state that my delegation is prepared to work on a full-scale schedule should the Conference on Disarmament so decide.

Last year the President of the United States made an important and timely initiative on chemical weapons. My delegation is grateful that it took two stumbling-blocks out of our way. But what is more significant is that it reaffirmed the commitment on the highest level in the United States to the conclusion of a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, and that there is no place on board for non-proliferation; a position that Egypt has always maintained.

Egypt is of the view that universal adherence to the chemical weapons convention is imperative. To attain univeral adherence all the Members of the United Nations should be involved, as appropriate, in the actual preparation of the convention. An open-ended preparatory commission to precede or follow a ministerial conference, or, as the Foreign Minister of Japan suggested when he addressed us on 6 June 1991, that "we should consider convening a meeting in Geneva at the level of high officials", could positively contribute towards the universality that we aspire to attain and could serve as a useful tool in our quest to encourage universal adherence. For this reason we appreciate the constructive step that the Conference on Disarmament took when it considered sending letters to States which are neither members of nor observers at our Conference, bringing to their attention the most recent report of the Ad Hoc Committee so that they could benefit from following the work in this important phase. By doing this, I believe that we would achieve two objectives. The first is to have more participation in our work by observers in the Conference, and the second is to embark on the open-ended preparatory phase we have been considering for a long time now.

In this connection, I would like to refer to the proposal to convene a ministerial meeting as one method of finalizing our work and ensuring universality. Since the proposed ministerial meeting is directly related to the package approach, the decision to convene it is anchored on what we will be able to accomplish in elaborating the package. The more concise the package is, the more easy it becomes to invite the ministers to accelerate the conclusion of the CW convention. On the other hand, if the package is not based on a comprehensive approach the preparation of the ministerial meeting becomes insufficient, and would have negative effects because we will only be left with incoherent positions at the highest level of decision-making, which could backfire.

It is good news that the members of the Conference have agreed to add a reference to the prohibition of use to the mandate. This, however, just brings the wording of the mandate into line with the unambiguous absolute prohibition against the use of chemical weapons that already exists in article I of the draft convention. Our aim is to conclude a convention which will be universally adhered to. But universal adherence in itself is subject

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

to the question of undiminished security - an issue which imposes itself in almost every aspect and provision of our draft convention. A legal question which is very relevant to the issue of undiminished security is the relation of the chemical weapons convention to other relevant international agreements. This provision is the cover under which unilaterally declared "rights" under the 1925 Geneva Protocol are to be transferred to and thereby eternalized in the chemical weapons convention. Some maintain the position that retaliatory use of chemical weapons in conformity with the reservations attached to the 1925 Protocol must remain permissible as long as chemical weapons exist. Any such attempts aiming at creating a situation of legal uncertainty about the scope of the prohibition and the implementation of the convention should be resisted, for it would undermine the integrity of the whole edifice of the convention. The convention should be the sole international contractual legal instrument that governs chemical weapons; otherwise we will be creating a dual legal regime. Furthermore, the legal uncertainty concerning the scope of the prohibition and the implementation of the convention will continue to plague the international community. The comprehensive undertaking not to use chemical weapons, which is already provided for in article I, paragraph 3 of the draft convention, is incompatible with any claim that a reservation to the 1925 Protocol can be carried through in the future. The chemical weapons convention should, therefore, provide that all States with retaliatory rights under the 1925 Protocol should renounce their reservations at the time they sign the convention.

Another important issue that falls directly under the broad concept of undiminished security is that of sanctions. In the absence of effective international control, comprising credible assurances as well as viable monitoring arrangements, the threat to both national and international security persists. This is why the international community should not limit itself to negative assurances in the manner followed with respect to the non-proliferation Treaty. What is needed is positive and credible assurances which would be applied through a mechanism elaborated by the convention and in conformity with the rules of international law. Sanctions, in my view, are guarantees to ensure ultimate compliance. In order to sustain the credibility of these sanctions, they will have to be monitored by the executive council acting under the appropriate supervision of the Security Council. In some cases non-compliance with the convention may constitute a threat to international peace and security. This is why I suggest that a clear relation be established between the functions and competence of the executive council and the Charter-prescribed responsibilities of the Security Council. The executive council should consider the questions of non-compliance and convey its conclusions and recommendations to the Security Council. My delegation welcomes the decision taken by the Ad Hoc Committee to incorporate a new article under the title "Measures to redress a situation and ensure compliance, including sanctions". My delegation has been advocating the inclusion of such an article since 1989. We do, however, realize that further work on this article and related provisions in other parts of the draft convention is still required.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Another pending issue is that of settlement of disputes. There is no provision in the "rolling text" at present on this subject. Certain references, however, exist, though scattered among some articles which specify one method, namely negotiations. What happens, for example, if a solution is not reached through negotiation? All such measures and methods of dispute settlement should be incorporated in the text. Provisions dealing with settlement of disputes should be assembled under a single article, and it should be expected that certain disputes may arise out of the application or the interpretation of the convention. We must, therefore, provide adequate means for the resolution of such disputes. It is reassuring that the Ad Hoc Committee has embarked on the consideration of this subject. A new and comprehensive article on this subject in the "rolling text" will no doubt be a stimulus for further work.

The chemical weapons convention is a functional agreement. Thus the organizational aspects of the convention acquire great relevance. The executive council will be the principal political organ of the organization to be established for the purpose of implementing the convention. The composition of the executive council and its decision-making mechanism should be determined on the basis of the functional requirements - that is to say rapidity in convening meetings and the ability to take timely decisions. A flexible non-discriminatory appointment regime should be adopted to safeguard the right of every State to serve on the council without any special rights or discrimination. The functions of the executive council are just as important. The council should be expected to supervise all the activities emanating from the convention. It should consider the questions of non-compliance and convey its conclusions and recommendations to the Security Council, as I have already stated.

I now turn to the question of verification. The credibility of the verification regime to be established by the convention will be one of the major factors governing its life course. A watertight verification regime is imperative in order to allow the convention to pursue its objectives. The draft convention envisages a number of verification measures. What is revolutionary about this convention is the idea that States parties to the convention are asked to accept, beforehand, the fact that the organization, through its appropriate organs, could at any time inspect any site on their respective territories. This innovation is a bold challenge to the concept of sovereignty. If such provisions are to be enshrined in the chemical weapons convention, as we all hope, they will open a new phase in international relations built on total transparency in all disarmament agreements.

The Ad Hoc Committee has been active on the issue of challenge inspections during the past few weeks. There are several proposals on this question, the most recent of which is the proposal presented by four States and contained in document CD/CW/WP.352. The purpose of any provision on challenge inspection should be to clarify and resolve questions of compliance with the convention. Requests for inspections must only be within the scope of the convention, which is the total prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The executive council should be informed of any request immediately, and should be able to convene right away to follow the course of the investigation so that timely decisions may be taken in order to facilitate the task of the inspectors and to control the situation. Although such inspections should be effective and timely, they should be executed in the least intrusive manner. The challenged State should have the right to protect its national security and industrial secrets. However, in order to ensure compliance by the challenged State, the chemical weapons convention should provide clear-cut procedures in order to strike a balance between these legitimate rights of States and the success of this regime. The report of the inspection operation has to be passed to the parties as well as to the executive council. This report should contain a statement of the factual findings of the inspectors, as well as a conclusion which would help the executive council in deciding whether the challenged party was in compliance with the convention or violating it. Furthermore, the executive council should be able to convene immediately to consider ways and means to remedy the situation and to ensure compliance. This would involve bringing the matter to the attention of the Security Council. A provision to ensure that the right to request challenge inspections will not be abused also has to be included in the text.

The convention should provide a protective umbrella for the States parties, in the form of assistance provided by the other States parties to limit the effect of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. This system should cover a whole range of measures from prevention to treatment. In addition to the question of automaticity required in implementing this provision, the convention must trigger a mechanism in a well-defined time-frame. It is a major achievement that the Ad Hoc Committee was able to move article X from appendix II to appendix I. However, transferring it to appendix I does not mean that article X cannot be improved. The work undertaken in Working Group A aims at attaining such improvement.

Another major step that the Ad Hoc Committee was able to achieve during the inter-sessional period was that of taking article XI off the shelf, where it has been for several years, and putting it in its proper place in appendix I. Article XI is a key provision for universal adherence to the convention. To a large extent, adherence to it will depend, inter alia, on the nature and scope of the provisions that will provide for international cooperation to develop the peaceful uses of chemical industries; a convention that does not, however, impede peaceful chemical activities. I wish to emphasize the interest of all States in ensuring that the economic and technological development of their chemical industry are not hampered. In this context, a technical assistance programme to help parties in organizing a system for monitoring their chemical industry should be devised. It is also imperative that the flow of chemicals, instruments and data be maintained. These concepts should be scrutinized so as to clearly reflect the rights and obligations within the context of a well-justified balance.

The Ad Hoc Committee is divided on the question of environment. We believe it is important to introduce provisions on environment in relation with the destruction of CW and any other activity prohibited by the convention.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

I now wish to address the issue of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Egypt has consistently striven to spare this region fraught with tension from the scourge of a possible recourse to any type of weapon of mass destruction. The accumulation of such weapons in the Middle East creates a destabilizing environment that endangers international peace and security.

Egypt has, since 1974, annually presented to the United Nations General Assembly a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Since 1980 that resolution has been adopted by the General Assembly by consensus. Last year a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General submitted a study. It is relevant to recall the conclusion contained in paragraph 110 of that study that "an effective zone would be a great improvement over the present situation. The problem is how to create the conditions in which a zone becomes a realistic development."

On 8 April 1990, President Hosni Mubarak proposed the establishment of a "zone free from weapons of mass destruction" in the Middle East. The three components of President Mubarak's proposal are the following: First, that all weapons of mass destruction without exception should be prohibited in the Middle East, nuclear, chemical or biological; second, that all States of the region without exception make an equal and reciprocal commitment in this regard; third, that verification measures and modalities be established to ascertain full compliance by all States in the region with the full scope of that prohibition without exception.

This initiative provides the appropriate framework for engaging States in the region in a process that would ultimately facilitate the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, and ensure regional collective accession through the encouragement of all States in the region to adhere to the international legal instruments that comprise the juridical regimes regulating weapons of mass destruction. These legal instruments are the non-proliferation Treaty, the biological weapons Convention of 1972 and the chemical weapons convention which is under preparation now at the CD. The successful employment of confidence-building measures in the Middle East will undoubtedly be augmented through the adherence of all parties in the region to these three important legal instruments.

Proposals on chemical and biological weapons relating to the region should be considered by these States within this framework. Egypt would like to reaffirm that disarmament measures relating to the different weapons of mass destruction cannot be taken in isolation, and that all the States of the region should be legally bound by the same obligations without any exception.

At this juncture, I am pleased to invite the attention of the CD to a letter dated 21 July 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, concerning the recent proposals on arms limitation and disarmament in the Middle East. This letter was reproduced on 30 July 1991 as an official document of the General Assembly (A/46/329) and the Security Council (S/22855). May I request the circulation of this document as an official document of the CD?

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

With your permission, Mr. President, I would like to conclude on a personal note. I had the honour to serve in the Egyptian delegation to the CCD in the mid-1970s, as you rightly pointed out. I was away from Geneva for 11 years. When I came back, four years ago, a glance at the Conference on Disarmament files and proceedings was sufficient to reveal that no progress whatsoever had been achieved in a whole decade. No doubt, all the members of the CD realized this fact, and there was an atmosphere of general disappointment. I am happy to state that today, when I am in the process of relinquishing my post in Geneva, I leave with feelings of hope and great expectations for the work of the Conference on Disarmament and for the efforts exerted to achieve disarmament in general. Several important developments have transformed our contemporary world in recent years. Suffice it to mention the general relaxation between the super-Powers and the oft referred-to attempts to revise the Charter of the United Nations and to make a genuine attempt to resuscitate its provisions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, several important agreements in the nuclear field have been concluded, and when it comes to the chemical weapons convention, there is a general agreement that the light at the end of the tunnel is now glowing brighter. Here I must confess that I envy you, distinguished members of the Conference on Disarmament, for you will soon witness the fruition of these long and arduous negotiations. I take leave of you, Mr. President, and look forward to seeing all of you next October in New York and to cooperating once more with you, in our joint endeavours to create a better world for future generations.

Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my old friends Ambassador Miljan Komatina, Secretary-General of the CD and Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, Deputy Secretary-General of the CD. Their advice and guidance has always been highly appreciated.

(continued in Arabic)

In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to the interpreters, especially those in the Arabic booth, and to thank them particularly for their efforts.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. The letter dated 21 July 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to which you referred, Ambassador, will be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): As you end your term of office as President, I would like to express the special appreciation of my delegation for the way in which you have conducted our work during this unique phase that the negotiating body is currently passing through. Your distinguished personal qualities and your professionalism have earned the respect of my delegation.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

On behalf of the Conference on Disarmament you have bidden farewell to two distinguished colleagues who have made a significant contribution to this Conference and to the multilateral effort being made in security and international cooperation. I believe that all of us, and in particular the Argentine delegation, will greatly miss the personal and professional qualities of the distinguished Ambassadors of Brazil, Rubens Ricupero, and Egypt, Nabil Elaraby. Just a few days ago another friend, the distinguished Ambassador Chadha of India, left us. The Conference will certainly not be the same without them.

As the formal session for 1991 draws to a close, the negotiations in the chemical weapons Committee are becoming more concrete in keeping with the time-frames and objectives we have set, in particular as the change in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, following the new impetus given to the negotiations as a result of President Bush's initiative, stipulated that next year we should conclude our already excessively prolonged work. Deadlines are approaching, and inevitably we have to tackle the most difficult questions, those which in the final analysis reflect our interest in the instrument designed to ban chemical weapons for ever. Now that the problem of the destruction of existing stockpiles has been resolved, and the issue of a ban on use has been directly and unequivocally included in the text of the convention, some questions of major importance still remain to be solved. This morning I will refer to some of them.

Allow me briefly to recall that in a previous statement, my delegation had occasion to express one or two ideas concerning the verification system for the chemical industry under article VI. At that time we tried to draw attention to the need for negotiating efforts to be directed towards a simpler formulation of the verification mechanism which at the same time would provide a credible guarantee that the provisions of the convention with respect to non-military activities in the chemical field would be duly complied with. We believe that the exercise that has been going on both in Group B as well as in the consultations led by France as a Friend of the Chair have to a large extent followed this thrust. But we think that further efforts could certainly be made to simplify the verification system under article VI, which should be focused on actual production of chemicals and production capacity, and not on the material flow or balance of chemicals, which, as much experience - including not a few national trial inspections - has shown, is not sufficiently accurate to support the conclusion that the convention is not being breached through the transfer of chemicals.

This brief initial digression serves to remind you of what, in the view of my delegation, should be the dominant guiding principle regarding inspections under article VI. On this same issue of verification of the chemical industry I think it is important to point out that the recent meeting at which representatives of the world chemical industry exchanged views with the members of the Committee confirmed the impression shared by many delegations involved in the negotiations that the verification system must be open and simple and must take account in a very special way of the principle

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

that the normal operations of the chemical industry must not be affected. In view of a recurrent tendency that has been observed in the negotiations in the Committee to insist on complex and indeed costly formulations, I will not hesitate to repeat today that this article deals with activities not prohibited by the convention, in other words, perfectly legitimate activities.

Advocates of these sophisticated verification systems have argued that the risk that certain facilities could pose for the convention should not be side-stepped. Risk, as everyone knows, is a category that pertains to the realm of perception. There is nothing less uniform in the field of disarmament than the security perceptions of the negotiating States. Hence what some might consider of paramount importance as a risk assessment parameter - production capacity, multi-purpose capability of a facility - could be perceived by others as less important than, for instance, its location. In other words, the fact that a plant might be located in an isolated place or might possess power sources indicating a high level of activity or one that would be difficult to justify under normal circumstances. Above all there is the political assessment of those involved, both that of the party assessing the risk and that of the potential transgressor. I sincerely believe that at this stage of our negotiations any risk assessment exercise which aspired to unanimity would be doomed to failure. This is why, as far as the Argentine Republic is concerned, an appropriate verification regime within the framework of article VI must be open, but at the same time realistic and circumscribed by parameters which are attainable and manageable both from the political and from the financial point of view.

The chemical weapons convention, as has been repeatedly stated, is a security treaty. This is its logical nerve-centre and the indisputable focal point of its content must be the provisions designed to secure the elimination and prevent the reappearance of chemical weapons. Therefore, for Argentina the chemical weapons convention must be equipped with a verification system which is sound and coherent from the viewpoint of security, and able to play effectively the deterrent role that any verification mechanism must play in order to discourage, or attach a very high political cost to, any breach of its provisions. That is why in our opinion the verification system under article IX is par excellence the most important element within the treaty's verification system if the treaty is to become a really successful agreement with universal adherence. I would therefore like to raise one or two ideas relating to the negotiations on article IX, and in particular challenge inspections, which we are concentrating on at the moment. Our thinking draws on consideration at the national level of what would be the implications and the scope of the system of challenge inspections, measured against the objectives of the convention and the legitimate security concerns that all the future States parties have to different degrees in this process.

At the same time, in voicing these ideas we have borne in mind the experience gained thanks to the positive and timely initiative of the delegation of Germany that enabled us to participate in the multilateral trial challenge inspection exercise held in an air base in the Frankfurt-Cologne

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

area between 22 and 24 May this year. This was a very positive experience, and in that context our gratitude and appreciation go to the German authorities, through Ambassador von Wagner and his delegation, for the excellent arrangements and the highly professional way in which they conducted this complex joint exercise.

In our view, the inspection, details of which will undoubtedly be presented with greater authority by the organizing delegation, succeeded in demonstrating that a challenge inspection is a highly intrusive exercise, but that it can nevertheless be made compatible with the necessary confidentiality that must protect certain military facilities or others with a high commercial or scientific value. The concept of managed access, duly developed on an ad hoc basis - that is, taking into account the characteristics of the site to be inspected - should allow physical access by the organization's inspectors to any site located in a State party whenever a properly justified request is made for challenge inspection.

The exercise at Pferdersfeld made it clear that there are areas - the role of observers, the relationship between the inspection team and the receiving State, the closure (securing) of the site, the availability of reliable means of communication for the inspection team, the need to draw up a fully agreed glossary of important terms for the convention in the five official languages of the United Nations, all issues on which considerable work still has to be done with a view to improvement. The conclusion, however, is encouraging in indicating that it is possible to aim for a strong system of challenge inspections without unduly affecting the security of the receiving State.

Very recently the Ad Hoc Committee received with keen interest a new proposal on challenge inspections put forward by your delegation, Mr. President, along with the delegations of Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom. It joins the existing proposals and will undoubtedly constitute a major contribution to our deliberations. We believe that a number of the elements we identified when referring to the inspection carried out in Germany in May have been taken into account by the authors of this initiative, and we welcome this fact as an encouraging element. At the same time, we think it useful to point out a few basic points that the final blueprint of verification under the convention should in our view include in its final form.

First of all, any system of challenge inspections agreed upon should guarantee the inspection team rapid, not to say immediate, access to the agreed site. Otherwise the challenge would turn into a phased warning, which we do not think would be in anyone's interest, not to mention the fact that any delay, be it at the moment of initiation or later on, would in our view contradict the very principle and the definition of challenge inspections. Secondly, access for the inspectors should be understood primarily as physical access, with the appropriate limitations arising out of the concept of managed access, carried out on an ad hoc basis in the light of the necessarily differing importance of the requested site from the viewpoint of practical

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

factors (geographical, access, and so on), as well as its significance from the point of view of the various aspects of confidentiality, whether scientific, commercial or military. The use of alternative forms and/or concepts of access should be elaborated in detail in order to avoid any counter-productive effect. We hope that the current negotiations will lead to progress on this point.

Without seeking to carry the analogy with the activities carried out by the special United Nations commission appointed to monitor compliance with Security Council resolution 687 further than prudence dictates in these cases, we believe that there are important lessons which must be drawn from this continuing exercise, in particular with regard to physical access for inspectors and securing of inspected sites. We believe that if all these considerations are taken into account, they will help to lead to agreement on a challenge inspection system which, in our opinion is worthy of the name.

As our negotiations proceed in various forums, it is common and refreshing to observe that when, perhaps on account of the fatigue and excessive emphasis on details that inevitably go hand in hand with any negotiating process as intense as ours, we get unnecessarily side-tracked in the negotiations, a delegation reminds us of the direction and aim of the exercise. Consequently, we must remember that we are actually negotiating a security agreement, an agreement that has clear and precise objectives and does not try to impose restrictions on the chemical industry, an agreement that in fact seeks to offer sufficient guarantees so that in signing it, States will gain an additional degree of security. This morning, while considering the verification system under article IX, my delegation, without seeking to correct anyone's course, would merely like to remind the Conference of the nature of our negotiations. I am sure that we shall not forget this basic premise in the forthcoming months, which will undoubtedly be the final months.

By way of conclusion, allow me to indicate that as representative of a State that ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925 without any reservations, we think that the time has come - the time can no longer be delayed - for those who ratified it with reservations to withdraw them so as to begin the 1992 session, during which the convention will be concluded, with a renewed spirit and commitment.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania) (translated from French): Two weeks ago, in the statement which I had the honour to deliver in this important forum, the Romanian delegation was pleased to note the imminent signature of the Treaty on the reduction of strategic armaments. Now, my delegation would like to join all the other delegations in praising the conclusion of this document by the Presidents of the United States and the USSR, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. For the record, I would also like to state that Romania considers this to be one of the great st achievements on the road to disarmament.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

The signature of the START Treaty puts an end to a period of common endeavours and mutual concessions, the only way of solving difficult problems of such dimensions and significance as those settled in this Treaty. By virtue of its content and final objective, the new Soviet-American Treaty can be regarded as an international instrument of truly historic significance. It gives expression to the present situation of the relationship between the two great nuclear Powers and international relations in general, as a result of profound changes that have occurred in Europe and all over the world.

The particular importance of the START Treaty consists, first of all, in our opinion, in the fact that for the first time an agreement has been reached for the effective reduction of total American and Soviet strategic nuclear armaments, a reduction of the number of both nuclear warheads and their strategic means of delivery to a substantially lower level of 30-50 per cent.

This agreement is, however, important not only for the substantial reductions in the nuclear capabilities of the two major nuclear Powers, but also for the increased stability that comes out of it. At the same time, the solutions agreed on a number of negotiating issues can be looked upon as a starting-point for new agreements whch will be of particular significance, taking into account the large amounts of armaments which still exist in the nuclear stockpiles.

Romania welcomes the intention of the United States of America and the USSR to carry on this process that has just begun in order to undertake new negotiations in the direction of further strengthening strategic stability, inter alia, in outer space. It hopes that such efforts will lead to the conclusion of new substantive agreements which uphold the structural changes and positive evolutions of our time. This, of course, will also be of great help for our negotiations in the Conference.

Mr. President, this is the last meeting under your presidency. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation for the way in which you have conducted our deliberations. For me as a newcomer in this important negotiating body, your skill and professionalism were of particular interest.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement, for his praise of the START Treaty and for his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Benhima.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, your presidency of the Conference on Disarmament is drawing to a close, a presidency which you have assumed with the skill of a veteran diplomat and the wisdom of a man imbued with eminent human qualities. I congratulate you on behalf of my delegation.

Recently, Ambassador Chadha took leave of the Conference. A few moments ago, it was the turn of Ambassador Elaraby, whose appointment to head the Egyptian mission in New York is the consummation of his strenuous work in Geneva. In a few days, Ambassador Ricupero, whose extensive learning and

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

perspicacity we appreciate very much, will leave us for Washington. To our three distinguished colleagues we express our wishes for happiness and success in their new duties, and to Ambassador Brotodiningrat we extend a welcome to Geneva.

Disarmament has become a universal concern since the international community became acutely aware of it. Hence any measure, regardless of its scope, becomes significant because it forms part of the process of general and complete disarmament. In that context, it is incontrovertible that the initiation of nuclear disarmament constitutes both an important milestone for the establishment of a climate of trust among States and a decisive factor to strengthen peace and security in the world. One need only recall the fears aroused by the arms race in the very recent past and by the apocalyptic consequences of a nuclear war to grasp the historic scope of the START Treaty signed on 31 July in Moscow, an event that we welcome. Consummating 10 years of laborious and often difficult negotiations, the Treaty provides for a 30 per cent reduction in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States of America and the Soviet Union and opens the door to a dynamic process that should in what we hope will be the near future, cover the thousands of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles not covered by the Moscow Agreement. This agreement is clearly the point of departure for smoother bilateral negotiations, the final aim of which would be the progressive and substantial dismantling of all nuclear arsenals. We hope that all the nuclear Powers will find in this dynamic process adequate grounds for reassurance concerning their own security, thereby facilitating their involvement in a broader process of reducing their nuclear potential.

The arms race in outer space remains a major source of concern for the international community. If we are not careful the growing trend towards its militarization would present serious threats to international détente, which is now being consolidated, and would ruin progress achieved in other areas. Everything possible must therefore be done to preserve this common heritage of all of mankind and to devote all mankind's energies to ensuring access to the peaceful uses of outer space. To realize this ambition and achieve the goal related to all issues connected with nuclear disarmament, it is imperative for the Conference to go beyond the stage of general debates and discussions and initiate substantive work on all issues without further delay. The demand for negotiations dealing with these fundamental issues is repeated at each session. As the sole multilateral negotiating forum in this field, the Conference has vested in it a responsibility that it cannot shirk or mask, and has a mandate that it must fulfil.

Among the vital issues on the agenda is a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty has been urged by the United Nations General Assembly, because it will lead inevitably to the prevention of both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Guided by this conviction, my delegation welcomed the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee last year, even though its mandate remains very limited. Guided also by the conviction that the complete prohibition of nuclear tests is an indispensable step along the path to nuclear disarmament, my delegation welcomes with interest the new draft treaty tabled by Sweden. We are

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

convinced that it will enrich deliberations on this issue, in particular through its provisions related to verification procedures and those concerning the organization. It is clear that the negotiation of such a draft treaty can take place within the Conference only if the Ad Hoc Committee has a mandate authorizing it to engage in this work. Our determination to consider this draft jointly could be demonstrated by giving the Committee a mandate to discuss it in a useful and constructive fashion.

The delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco concurs with the other members of the Conference in their wish to see the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons finalized within the planned time-frame. The conclusion of such a convention, in our opinion, is a very important disarmament measure. The substantial progress achieved has warranted our hope that the finalization of a text acceptable to all is near at hand. We do not, however, overlook the serious difficulties which remain.

Unanimous regret has been expressed in the Conference at the considerable time that has been devoted to procedural and organizational matters. Hence the need for our forum to make a resolute commitment to defining ways and means of improving the functioning of the Conference and endowing it with the necessary requisites for improved effectiveness. Several proposals have been presented to that end. My delegation hopes that, once they have been examined, satisfactory solutions will emerge under the dynamic impetus provided by Ambassador Kamal.

The Conference on Disarmament is pursuing its task at a time when the current far-reaching changes are outlining the contours of the world of tomorrow and defining the major orientations of man's destiny. The welcome trend in international relations that has emerged in the wake of the cold war offers greater opportunities to the Conference on Disarmament, which should spare no effort to attain the objectives it has been set. Despite our differences of perception as to certain aspects of our work, we should demonstrate our will to overcome the present difficulties in order to build a future of peace and security for future generations.

In conclusion, allow me to refer to an idea expressed recently by His Majesty the King of Morocco in a statement on the Middle East problem: "If disarmament is a logical consequence of peace, it is equally an indispensable precondition for long-lasting peaceful relations among peoples and States". Hence, Mr. President, we continue to believe that our quest for disarmament is a matter of necessity and not just of virtue.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. May I ask whether any other representative wishes to take the floor at this point? I see none. Then we will turn to other business.

You will recall that, in the programme of work for this annual session, we had agreed to hold two weekly plenary meetings during the period 12-23 August. After consultations with the coordinators, consensus has been reached in cancelling the two plenary meetings that had been scheduled for

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Tuesday 13 and Tuesday 20 August. That agreement has been reached as no speakers were inscribed for those two meetings and it seemed advisable therefore to make the resources allocated for those meetings available for other purposes. It is understood that, as has been the practice up to now, one weekly plenary meeting would be held during those two weeks, namely on the two Thursdays, 15 and 22 August. I suggest now that we adopt formally the decision to cancel those two Tuesday meetings.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Next, the secretariat has circulated today the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable is indicative and may be subject to change, if needed. On this understanding, I propose that we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In connection with the timetable for the current week, I am requested by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons to announce that the Ad Hoc Committee will hold another meeting tomorrow, Friday, at 3 p.m., in this conference room.

I have no other business for today, and shall now proceed to make my closing statement at the end of the presidency of the United States of America.

At the beginning of my presidency, I was informed how lucky I was since most of the hard work of setting things up and getting them going had already been done by my capable predecessors, and it would fall to my successor to wind up the CD's work for the year. Well, that proved to be the case; there were few procedural accomplishments these past four weeks. Happily, the trade-off seems to have been that we have moved forward in some important substantive areas in the chemical weapons talks, bringing us closer to the target of a convention by next year.

I also take note of progress made in the second meeting this year of the Group of Scientific Experts and the completion of the GSETT-II experiment; the acceptance of Malta as the thirty-seventh CD non-member participant this year; and also the work done by Ambassador Kamal's open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning. It is my hope that in addition, our discussions on report-writing will encourage those responsible to minimize the time devoted to it so as to allow us to spend more time working on substantive CW issues. In this connection, I welcome the decision confirmed here today to reduce the plenary meetings scheduled for the next two weeks to one per week.

As I mentioned at the beginning of my presidency, I asked Ambassador Kamal to assist me in private, informal consultations concerning the possibilities for expansion of the CD's membership. All of you are aware that he has pursued this task energetically and with tact. After extensive consultations, however, we compared results and reluctantly concluded that agreement on an

(The President)

expansion plan acceptable to all is still elusive. Moreover, we found an increasing number of delegations who feel the expansion issue might better be left for a later time because they fear the politicization of the CD expansion question while we are making a major effort to achieve a CW convention.

The signing of the START Treaty in Moscow last week is a major arms control event which contributes significantly to strategic stability and security in the world. I would hope we can draw inspiration from this signal accomplishment to reinvigorate our own efforts in the CD to complete a chemical weapons convention by next year, a goal we set for ourselves in the revised mandate we recently approved for the CW Ad Hoc Committee.

Many issues remain, but we cannot for a moment slacken our efforts to resolve them if we are to achieve a CW convention in the time that is left to us. Specifically, we must make the maximum possible use of the inter-sessional time between our formal CD meetings, as our CW Ad Hoc Committee Chairman, Ambassador Batsanov, seeks to do. Our Governments and peoples will expect us to produce results in the time-frame we announced. The credibility and even the future of our Conference could be at stake. I therefore urge that we capitalize on the momentum we have recently created for ourselves, reinforced by the historic moment created by signature of the START Treaty, to finish the negotiations on the single most important multilateral arms control treaty in many years. Its time has come.

As I now pass on my responsibilities to Ambassador Arteaga, he has my earnest best wishes and full support for continuing the forward momentum of our work. He brings great skill and experience to the task, and we all wish him well as he assumes the CD presidency for the next five months, not four weeks but five months.

Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui and their skilled secretariat have my full appreciation. Without their diligent efforts, the work associated with the presidency would have been difficult. I would also like to thank the group coordinators who made up the CD President's bureau.

This concludes my closing statement. I have no other business for this plenary meeting and would now proceed to adjourn it. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 15 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.602
15 August 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 15 August 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Horacio Arteaga (Venezuela)

GE.91-62259/3605B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 602nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, I would like to make my opening statement. It is an honour for me to take up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of Venezuela. On this occasion I should like to emphasize the irrevocable commitment of Venezuela and the President of the Republic, Carlos Andrés Pérez, to the cause of disarmament, which in this Conference enjoys a forum of fundamental and prime importance. As far as we are concerned, everything that has to do with efforts to promote the different and complex aspects of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, is of fundamental significance, and we will therefore continue to participate actively in this and other relevant forums. Venezuela believes in the potentialities of this Conference and the joint capacity to move forward, ever more resolutely, towards the goals we have set ourselves, in accordance with the requirements and expectations of these tumultuous times.

I should like to express my gratitude and sincere congratulations to Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States for the effective, skilled and responsible way in which he chaired the work of the Conference during his term. We truly appreciated his presidency. I also extend my appreciation and congratulations to the distinguished Ambassadors Rasaputram of Sri Lanka, Hyltenius of Sweden, Batsanov of the Soviet Union and Solesby of the United Kingdom, who have wisely discharged that function since the beginning of the current year.

I wish to express my complete readiness and full determination in discharging the tasks that fall to me during this period, which includes the drafting and final adoption of the report that the Conference has to submit to the forty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. I am certain that I will enjoy the valuable cooperation of all the distinguished delegates and the always efficient support of the secretariat, Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui, in carrying out my tasks, especially in drafting and adopting the report, which, as you know, reflects the intensive work carried out in the course of the year.

The international situation in which we find ourselves is different from that of only a few years ago. The historic events of recent times have marked the abandonment of old antagonisms and intransigence, and have allowed the emergence of better prospects for peace, solidarity and understanding in the concert of nations. The dialogue and openness which now characterize world events have helped to foster disarmament agreements and confidence-building measures, and should encourage greater progress in this field in an upward process. Even such serious and regrettable crises as the Gulf war served to make the international community aware of the threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction and the need to adopt concrete measures to eliminate that danger.

We welcomed with great satisfaction the strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty (START) recently signed by the United States and the Soviet Union after nine years of painstaking negotiations. This is a very important step in the

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history of the bilateral negotiations on arms control, which we hope will generate an atmosphere of greater transparency and trust in international relations, as well as future disarmament agreements which will make it possible to replace nuclear deterrence by a strategy founded on common security. It is also our hope that agreements of such significance will have a favourable impact on the tenacious disarmament efforts being pursued in the multilateral sphere, and specifically in this Conference.

It is always hoped that the message forwarded to the United Nations General Assembly by the Conference on Disarmament in its annual report will record progress in the negotiations carried out under its auspices. On this occasion it is striking that genuine progress has been made in dealing with the subject of chemical weapons. Of clear importance in these negotiations is the inclusion of the reference to the prohibition of use in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, as well as in relevant parts of the draft convention, and provisions on the total destruction of chemical weapons. We recognize the encouraging turn taken by these negotiations as a result of the decision of the United States Administration not to use chemical weapons against any country, in any circumstances, and to destroy all its arsenals of such weapons. As stipulated in its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is to intensify its work with the aim of achieving final agreement on the convention by 1992. I should like to encourage all delegations to continue their efforts to that end.

With regard to other items on the agenda I should add that a new methodology of work has been established in the various committees, which has allowed a better assessment of the different aspects relating to the items before them. I think that as a result of this work we will be able to make progress subsequently in a more thorough analysis with a view to adopting measures.

Recently the informal meetings on items 2 and 3 of our agenda, nuclear disarmament and prevention of a nuclear arms race, were completed. In the discussion the various positions were set out in detail and important information was received on various initiatives of special interest. I cannot fail to mention in particular the consultations carried out by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan on improving the functioning and effectiveness of the work of the Conference. They undoubtedly constitute an appropriate basis for the future consideration of this subject. Furthermore, the consultations carried out on the expansion of the membership of the Conference have been useful in clarifying positions and allowing more thorough consideration of the subject.

I would like to wish the chairmen of the various committees every success in the process of negotiation and adoption of their reports. I am entirely at your disposal to cooperate wherever I can. Let us make the best possible use of the time available to make progress in our work.

(The President)

On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of Argentina, the United States of America, Canada (who will be speaking as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I now give the floor to the first speaker on the list, the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCÍA MORITÁN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I would like to express my delegations particular satisfaction, Mr. President, that a representative such as youself of a great Latin American country has taken up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament today. I am certainly not the first or the last Argentine diplomat to have the honour and pleasure of working under your guidance. I witnessed the way in which your extensive diplomatic experience made itself felt on the regional stage when you were Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, and we have every confidence that our negotiations will benefit at this final stage from your personality, experience and professionalism.

A little more than a year ago we and the distinguished delegation of the Federative Republic of Brazil began the practice of making joint statements at this Conference on substantive questions of common interest. At that time I had occasion to set forth some joint general comments in relation to the first item on our agenda. At the beginning of the current session, the distinguished Ambassador Rubens Ricupero - whom I will miss very much following his departure from this conference - addressed the Conference in connection with the Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy signed by the Presidents of our two countries at Foz do Iguaçu in November 1990. On that occasion, the Ambassador of Brazil said that the joint machinery and procedures established by our countries in the nuclear field were the corollary and natural result of broad, stable and close cooperation embracing all major fields. These achievements in turn proved that confidence-building in the nuclear field could be achieved through close cooperation in the technical and political fields on the basis of openness and transparency.

This morning, speaking once again on behalf of the two delegations, I would like to point out that under the first stage outlined in the Declaration, on 18 July 1991, in Guadalajara, Mexico, on the occasion of the recent summit of heads of state and government of Latin American countries, Presidents Menem and Collor signed an "Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy". In operational terms, the agreement formally establishes a joint accounting and control system for nuclear materials, with the aim of verifying compliance with commitments entered into, in particular as regards surveillance of all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities carried out in the two countries. To administer the system, the agreement creates a supervisory Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control. This agency will be composed of two bodies - one of a political nature, the Commission, which will supervise the overall operation of the system, and a

(Mr. Garcia Moritán, Argentina)

technical body, the Secretariat, which will coordinate the actions necessary to gather information, carry out inspections and process the data collected. Moreover, as additional and, I think, unquestionable evidence of the peaceful nature of the nuclear programmes of the two countries, we are negotiating a joint safeguards agreement with IAEA.

Brazil and Argentina consider that such initiatives constitute a full, sufficient and verifiable guarantee of the peaceful aims of their nuclear programmes. However, considering the importance they attach to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the two countries will adopt initiatives whereby it will enter fully into force, including action to update and improve the Treaty.

The agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy requires legislative approval in the two countries for its entry into force, and the text will be circulated in this Conference in due course.

The agreement consolidates in a legally binding instrument the special relations of cooperation existing between our countries in the nuclear field. In this context, it should be noted that the regime established by the agreement will be complemented by measures in the field of economic integration aiming at the free movement of nuclear materials and equipment between the two countries. This aspect is also of particular importance because it is an integral part of a more comprehensive plan for development encompassing all spheres of production in the two countries and extending to Uruguay and Paraguay in the context of the Southern Common Market.

In this endeavour, which involves breaking out of underdevelopment once and for all, we give due priority to scientific and technological programmes. We are very pleased to have arrived at an instrument which offers an appropriate response to the legitimate concerns which may be prompted by dual-use advanced technologies. This example of international cooperation demonstrates how it is possible to find the path to a wider exchange in such a way that advanced technologies do not remain the privilege of a few. In that context, the broad-ranging process of integration between Argentina and Brazil and its ramifications for the other countries of the sub-region demonstrate, in our view, how the indispensible possession of advanced technologies can be reconciled with a regional framework that is stable, predictable and free of suspicions from the security viewpoint.

The accidents of time and history have presented all of us with the unexpected opportunity of playing leading roles in a world of increasing interdependence and integration. Economic and industrial factors, and the transnational effects of technology, have created a network of mutual interests and confidence-building measures which allow us to deal multilaterally with political problems on different bases. In the view of Argentina and Brazil this situation requires a search for a clear, international consensus in key areas. In science and technology, it seems to us essential to embark on a detailed analysis on the basis of criteria which

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

are more in keeping with the times. We pointed this out in a joint document at the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It seems that a process of this kind would require, on the one hand, that we tackle the qualitative problems related to weapons of mass destruction, and on the other hand, agree on balanced guidelines that take into account aspects connected with the dual use of any technology while at the same time not affecting or impairing the need for the continuous development, application and transfer of new technologies and the related economic and industrial requirements. As we are demonstrating in the regional framework, we believe that it is possible to establish appropriate confidence-building machinery aimed at strengthening international security with mutually complementary actions in an effective system of cooperation in advanced technologies.

In the political lexicon of our times the word "change" features as a constant. There is another which is perhaps used less frequently but has a particular priority in matters of security - "stability". Both concepts suggest that change, which must be promoted and monitored, requires an indispensable amount of global stability in order to generate an appropriate framework of peace and security. In this context, we believe that indispensable progress at the regional level should indisputably be accompanied by harmonization at the global level. The system of collective security envisaged by those who drafted the Charter of the United Nations now has a chance, in our view, to be translated into concrete terms. What needs to be done - no more and no less - is to define it and put it into effect in a balanced manner, perhaps in this very Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement on behalf of the delegations of Argentina and Brazil, as well as the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I give the floor now to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I take the floor today for several purposes. The first is to welcome, wholeheartedly, your accession to the CD presidency. Thank you for your kind words a few moments ago about my just concluded term of office. Yours, however, will be both more challenging and more extensive, but without question you are exactly the right diplomat with exactly the right talents to give us the precise direction and leadership that we will need. As I mentioned in my own closing speech last week, you have my full support and that of my delegation as you take on this important responsibility for the next several months.

Secondly, I would like to introduce a United States paper that deals with a national trial challenge inspection at a United States commercial chemical production facility last year. This inspection represents one of a series of such exercises that the United States Government is carrying out at commercial and government facilities. Rather than go into the details at this time of the lessons learned during this productive experience, I will simply note that the paper has been turned over to the secretariat for circulation as an official Conference document. It should be available to you shortly.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The third and fourth elements of my remarks today deal with chemical weapons, and with the report writing process in which the CD is now engaged. Although the latter item is more immediate in terms of the time pressures we face, I wish to make my principal remarks first on the far more important and central goal of our Conference at this moment: completion of a chemical weapons convention by 1992. Since President Bush announced his chemical weapons initiative last 13 May, the CW Ad Hoc Committee has made significant progress. Article I of the draft convention now explicitly bans use of chemical weapons, against anyone, under any circumstances. In article IV there is now no question about the obligation to complete the destruction of chemical weapons during the 10 years after the convention enters into force. Agreement seems near to place articles X and XI in appendix I of the "rolling text", and we should be able to take the same step with an improved article VI as well. We are now in the midst of serious exploration of challenge inspection, perhaps the thorniest issue in our convention. And we also believe that progress in a number of other areas such as jurisdiction and control will be reflected in the "rolling text".

Bearing in mind our goal, I submit to you that we must now make a conscious decision to direct our energies more closely on the major issues for the remainder of 1991. In my view there are currently four such issues at this stage: challenge inspection, verification in the chemical industry, the composition and decision-making process of the executive council, and universality. I will address each of these issues in turn.

On challenge inspection, as you know, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia presented a new approach last month designed to move the Conference at last toward resolution of this key issue. The four delegations sought to strike the right balance between access necessary for effective verification, and the need to protect sensitive activities that are not related to chemical weapons and avoid potential abuse of challenge inspection provisions. The regime we propose balances all of the security interests of States parties. It will enhance prospects for universal compliance and, when it enters into force, will give the international inspectorate the ability to discover the facts. It will deter would-be violators, and at the same time provide States parties with reasonable protection of their legitimate activities.

No text is perfect. We have taken due note of the views expressed on the proposal in the Ad Hoc Committee. We are encouraged by the general support shown in discussions so far for the concept of graduated, managed access to challenged sites. We are aware that some delegations would prefer more mandatory access, and that others would like to see stronger mechanisms for protecting sensitive sites. We are also pleased that our proposal has generated useful conceptual discussion of the role of the executive council. Much remains to be thrashed out, but we are confident that we can reach consensus on this critical question.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

With respect to monitoring the chemical industry, the proposal made by eight non-aligned delegations in July was a major advance. It preserves key features of the regime that is currently set forth in article VI of the "rolling text", but closes an important loophole that would have allowed many relevant facilities to escape inspection. As a result of the eight-delegation proposal the Ad Hoc Committee has almost reached consensus to extend the monitoring provisions in Article VI to all CW-capable facilities. Work remains to delimit the industry and exclude those not posing a risk and to work out the inspection regime, but we believe that the general support for coverage of such facilities should be reflected in appendix I of the "rolling text".

Much discussion has taken place on the selection process for facilities to be inspected. We, and many others, believe that the selection process must reflect security interests. Given the many thousands of relevant facilities, States parties must play a role in designating facilities for inspection. This approach is not challenge inspection in disguise. These inspections are routine, and will be conducted accordingly. We recognize the concerns of others about abuse through national selection and believe that safeguards must be incorporated, for instance agreed limits on the annual number of inspections in a given State. We are grateful for the work of the Chairman of Group B on this issue, and will give his proposed approach careful study.

Some have argued that the composition and decision-making process of the executive council can be settled only at the end of these negotiations. We believe, on the contrary, that broad consensus is developing in the Committee, and that agreement on the structure and operations of this vital executive body will help us settle other, more substantive, issues. We believe there is broad support for an executive council of approximately 20 to 25 members. Selection would be based on a combination of geographical and industrial criteria. Decision-making on substantive issues would be by a qualified majority. Several delegations have already expressed views on the executive council and we hope that Working Group C can take this up immediately.

The fourth major issue that I want to discuss is universality. How can the Conference structure the convention to encourage all States to join? I want to express my agreement with my distinguished Argentine colleague, Ambassador García Moritán, who noted last week that a chemical weapons convention is primarily a security agreement. Other delegations have pointed out the need to include restrictions and disincentives for countries who, after a reasonable period of time, choose to remain outside. We strongly agree. We have proposed that, after a suitable transition period, arrangements for trade in CW-related chemicals should discriminate against non-parties. Our proposal will require parties to refuse to trade in CW-related materials with all States that do not become parties to the CW convention within a reasonable period of time. These provisions relate directly to the central purpose of the convention, and to the security of future States parties. We will ask for your support on these grounds.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

There is one more issue that I would like to discuss today, namely longstanding problems of "old" or "abandoned" chemical weapons. This issue is not now a major obstacle to completing the convention. If it can be resolved promptly it will not become one. However, we must come to grips with it. We recognize that this issue reflects a number of different problems, all of them politically sensitive. Concern has been expressed, for example, about negative public reaction to labelling such "chemical weapons" in the convention. The term "chemical weapons" has a powerful emotional and political impact and there is a risk of public misunderstanding. For this reason, we believe it would be useful to explore the possibility of a differentiated approach to the required declarations. This would ensure that the differing situations are not lumped together under the single heading of "chemical weapons".

Another concern is over the responsibility for destruction when chemical weapons produced by one State are found on the territory of another State. It would be best for such matters to be settled between the two States involved. In any case, we cannot afford to have a loophole allowing a State party to retain chemical weapons on its territory if not removed or destroyed by the State owning them.

Unfortunately, much of the discusson on these issues has taken place without adequate information. I propose to you that the Conference can no longer work on the basis of rumours and corridor conversations. We urge the Governments that have problems with old and abandoned chemical weapons to provide technical information on the nature of the problems that exist. This could be done, for example, during the meeting of destruction experts that will be held this fall. We believe that such information would not only help to clarify the situation, but also would facilitate cooperative efforts to ensure that the weapons are disposed of safely. In this connection, I would like to recall the offer of the United States to provide technical assistance for destruction of chemical weapons to any State faced with this problem.

On the subject of adequate information, a number of participants in the negotiations have not yet indicated whether or not they possess chemical weapons. We call on them to do so, in order that members of the conference can make an accurate assessment of the dimensions of the chemical weapons problem.

I would now like to review where we are at this stage in the CW negotiations. As I mentioned earlier, many of the issues on which we have made progress this summer were reflected in the CW Ad Hoc Committee Chairman's paper last spring as the key issues requiring political attention and which might ultimately be elements of a possible package. Earlier this summer the United States made substantial moves on many of these key issues, particularly on the questions of right of retaliation, and on our two per cent proposal to achieve universality, and also on articles X and XI. Additionally we have introduced provisions for challenge inspection and we stand ready to discuss the executive council and the issue of costs. In light of these steps, I

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

confess to some disappointment in recent days on both substantive and procedural grounds. We have heard threats by individual delegations that unless they get what they want in one article, they will hold up another article. Such tactical linkage which is devoid of substantive rationale only invites retaliation in kind.

At this stage in the negotiations, if we are to have a CW convention in 1992, we believe that all serious proposals, and especially proposals receiving broad support, should be reflected in appendix I of the "rolling text", if necessary with footnotes and/or brackets. The time has come to cease unfocused general discussions. If we are to find solutions to the issues, the best basis is actual language proposed for the convention. Let us cease arguing over the placement of papers in other appendices. Then we can focus our efforts on the proposed treaty text itself, seek compromises where possible and where not, clearly identify alternatives for political solution.

Let me add that we are disappointed that a small number of delegations are blocking agreement on a work programme to carry the CW Commitee through till next January. My Government finds this difficult to understand, in view of the opportunity to wrap these negotiations up and achieve a convention next year. My delegation does not consider this matter closed, and will continue to press for CW work during the eight weeks of the BWC Review Conference and the disarmament portion of the First Committee. To that end we call on capitals represented here to augment their delegations as necessary.

In my statement today I have outlined the areas of which I believe work should focus, and the approach we should take. Let me leave the subject of chemical weapons with a cautionary note. I have heard it said that some in this chamber believe that following the Gulf War and operation "Desert Storm", the United States has less interest in a CW convention. This argument holds that we have demonstrated that for ourselves, chemical weapons capability on the part of an aggressor can be handled with weapons in our conventional inventory, and that we and the Soviet Union have taken care of the problem of our own large CW stocks and security requirements with our bilateral arrangements.

This line of argument is mistaken. United States security will be enhanced by the convention. Furthermore, the United States has allies and friends around the world whose security, including security from chemical attack, is vital to us. The United States-Soviet bilateral agreement signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev 1 June last year is integrally linked with achievement of a CW convention. So we will continue to work as hard as ever for agreement here. It would, however, be equally mistaken to believe that the United States and its allies are more interested in achieving a CW convention than other members of our Conference, and accordingly that an increasing number of provisions unrelated to chemical weapons can be added to the Treaty in the expectation we will continue to make concessions. We are not les demandeurs in this negotiation. Conclusion of a CW convention will enhance the security of each and every State that becomes a party. This is important, a worthy goal: Let's keep it in sight.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

Let me turn now to an area where our performance has been less than outstanding - the Conference's annual report-writing process. This process threatens to get out of control. I submit that we spend too much time (approximately 3 of our 24 working weeks) and too much money (well more than $US 1,000 a page) on report-writing. The time has come for reform.

During my recent CD presidency I made a serious attempt to reduce the CD report-writing effort in order to allocate more time to our CW negotiations. I suggested preparing a relatively brief report, based on the requirements of rule 45. This would have meant dropping the compilation of groups' political views on each agenda item - the most time-consuming, contentious and wasteful part of the report-writing effort. It replicates information available elsewhere, and it generates large quantities of political smoke and fire more appropriate to the General Assembly than to the more practical negotiating body we work in. Furthermore, the CD secretriat asked that the CW portion of the report be shortened by dropping appendix II, thereby saving a significant amount of money.

While these objectives had broad support, some participants insisted there could be no changes in cherished routines. Only in the case of the radiological weapons and outer space ad hoc committee reports have we thus far seen efforts made to shorten reports or eliminate political wrangling. Everywhere else we see business as usual - or worse. The NSA and NTB committee draft reports are already heavily politicized, in some cases with rhetoric reminiscent of the height of the cold war. In the NTB draft report one regional group has taken a verbatim transcript approach and is attempting to drive in more than eight full pages of text advertising or supporting its views. They have resorted to distortion of fact and misrepresentation of the views of others. The West was left with few options to achieve the necessary accuracy and balance, other than to draft eight pages of its own if it wished to propose them for bitter negotiation. So much for the effort to reduce the CD report-writing chore so as to devote more time to CW!

While I held your seat, Mr. President, my position required me to act evenhandedly and to take the views of all CD members and groups into account in conducting our business. To some extent I had to put my national role and objectives on the shelf during that period. That is no longer the case. While it may be too late for wholesale changes in the report-writing process, I propose that we try now to begin a less politicized and more cost-effective effort. Specifically, I would urge the negative security assurances and nuclear test ban ad hoc committee chairmen to try to limit political position statements by each group to no more than one or two pages each. This limit should also apply to the reports on CESNAR, PNW and CPD. My delegation is prepared to withhold consensus on those substantive sections of the CD report which are polemical, imbalanced, and unfactual.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

These are drastic steps. At a time when we are trying to negoitiate an important global treaty, however, I believe they are absolutely essential. By consensus we set a deadline for ourselves of achieving a CW convention by 1992. We enshrined this goal in a revised mandate for the CW Ad Hoc Committee. Yet we are letting "business as usual" entangle us in sterile report-writing debates reminiscent of a time gone by.

Thus, I hereby request that the problematic committee contributions of this year be compressed and limited to each group's views and that the issue of CD report-writing be placed on the agenda of next year's open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning. We must provide for a much briefer, cheaper and more useful report, which people might actually read. The current product meets almost none of these criteria.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Mr. Robertson, who, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons will present the Committee's report, which has been distributed today as document CD/1099.

Mr. ROBERTSON (Canada): Mr. President, since this is the first time a member of our delegation has taken the floor since you assumed your presidency, allow me to begin by joining those previous speakers who have commended that fact and let me also assure you that the members of the Canadian delegation are willing and would be very pleased to assist you in the carrying out of your tasks in any way possible. You have a very long term ahead of you as our President, until the CD is re-established in 1992, and among the other issues you will be confronted with is that of assuring that useful work on the chemical weapons convention can be carried out during the inter-sessional period. We wish you every success.

Now I would like to say a few words in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, and I take pleasure in introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, which is before you today in English under symbol CD/1099.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons was among the two committees re-established at the start of the Conference's session and I understand that it is the first to submit its report to the Conference. There are several reasons why this is so. One of them was the really excellent positive, cooperative and professional spirit displayed by delegations throughout the session in our consideration of the item. Another reason was the speedy resumption at the beginning of our work of the two-track approach to the issue: track A quickly resumed work on the draft articles of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons and track B continued to consider possible elements relevant to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.

(Mr. Robertson, Canada)

Yet another reason for the rapid presentation of this report was the energetic and skilled work performed by the coordinators of the two tracks, Mr. Scott Omene of Nigeria and Mr. Gueorgui Dimitrov of Bulgaria. I should like to express my personal appreciation as well as that of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee to them both for a job well done. Finally, a relevant factor that explains why our work moved along well in the Ad Hoc Committee was that it is done on the basis of texts presented from previous years. Thus little time is needed for general debate and the bulk of the work can be relegated to the two contact groups.

What did we accomplish this year? In general terms, at least compared to the dramatic movements we have seen and have heartily welcomed in other disarmament fields, it might appear that not much has been gained. However, through its regular albeit time-consuming, step-by-step approach to the issues before it, the Ad Hoc Committee has made relative progress.

With respect to the draft articles for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, there is now in the text an alternative proposal to tackle the question of scope and definitions. Delegations will have this proposal under study during the inter-sessional period. New agreed texts were also elaborated to provide for amendments and for review conferences, while the verification and compliance provision was further refined.

As regards the possible elements relevant to a convention on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, let me first point out that the crucial question of the scope of an eventual convention, that is, what facilities would be protected, saw no movement. It is clear therefore that more time will still be needed on this point. However, further refinements and clarifications have been made to the elements dealing with the register and to parts of the verification and compliance schema.

In its conclusions, the Ad Hoc Committee has recommended that the Conference decide on an early re-establishment of the Committee next year. As outgoing Chairman, I thoroughly endorse this recommendation.

In closing I wish to take this opportunity to thank again all delegations for their contributions to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and for their support to the Chair throughout the year. Allow me also to again congratulate the two coordinators of the contact groups, Mr. Omene and Mr. Dimitrov. And I also want to thank all the concerned members of the secretariat for their support and help.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons for introducing the Committee's report, and also for his kind words addressed to myself. I wish to convey our congratulations to Mr. Robertson on his guidance of the work of the Committee, which enabled it to reach consensus rapidly on the report he has just introduced. I intend to put the report, contained in document CD/1099, before the Conference for adoption at our next plenary meeting on Thursday 22 August.

(The President)

I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Solesby.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I should like first of all to join previous speakers in congratulating you, Mr. President, on your accession to your post. We all know well your wide experience and your skills and we have every confidence in the wise leadership you will give us during the remaining weeks of this session and beyond.

Today, I would like to make a statement regarding agenda items 2 and 3 on behalf of the Western Group.

In this time of profound and rapid change, the Western Group continues to attach significance to the nuclear items on our agenda. We welcome discussions in this forum regarding nuclear disarmament because we believe such discussions play a positive role in strengthening international security and stability in the nuclear age. However, it remains the view of the Western Group that the prevention of a nuclear war can only be dealt with satisfactorily in the broader context of the prevention of war in general. The real question at issue is how to maintain peace and international security in the nuclear age. The prevention of war in the nuclear age is a global concern and not merely the responsibility of certain States or military alliances. This fact has been sadly underscored by the tragic events of this past year in the Gulf.

Times are changing, more hopefully perhaps than at any time in history. But a time of change is inevitably a time of uncertainty, of turmoil, and fear as well as of hope. The challenge for all of us is to see that these changes are directed in peaceful and positive channels. Developments in East-West relations and in other regions suggest that real progress is possible in the field of arms control and disarmament. The changes that are taking place are bringing us closer to the realization of the vision of a more just, humane and democratic world. If sustained, these trends will strengthen the prospects for fundamental improvements in international relations, a prerequisite for real progress not just in nuclear disarmament but in all disarmament matters.

The basic goal of Western arms control and disarmament policy has been and continues to be to prevent war by strengthening security and increasing stability at the lowest level of forces and armaments consistent with the requirements for legitimate individual or collective self-defence. We are convinced that arms control and confidence-building measures will continue to help shape and consolidate the development of a new cooperative order, as envisaged in the United Nations Charter, in which no country need harbour fears for its security. The Western Group believes that negotiations in all regions of the world intended to reduce the risk of conflict, to eliminate arms races, and to build mutual confidence in an equitable and stabilizing manner can contribute significantly to international security.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

The Western Group of States have worked for many years to advance progress in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament on a regional and global basis. The Gulf crisis demonstrated that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and of systems capable of delivering them, as well as excessive build-up of conventional arms, undermine international security and increase the risk of armed conflict throughout the world. To meet this challenge, we have renewed our commitment to the earliest possible achievement of advances in the international forums dealing with specific proliferation issues.

The Western Group is strongly committeed to, and will continue to work towards universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty. In this regard, the Western Group welcomes the recent important accessions in southern Africa to the Treaty and China's recent affirmation of its intention, in principle, to accede to the NPT. The other members of the Western Group also welcome France's decision, in principle, to accede to the Treaty. The Western Group calls on all States to become parties to the NPT, in that universal membership and full compliance with its provisions by all parties are important for the further strengthening of that Treaty. The Western Group supports the role of IAEA in facilitating the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in administering safeguards. We also support responsible export behaviour by States which are in a position to cooperate with others in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Recalling that it is incumbent upon all States to intensify their efforts and take steps to promote disarmament, the members of the Western Group observe with growing concern the acquisition and the development of ballistic missile technology for, possibly, other than peaceful purposes by an increasing number of States. The elimination of this potential source of international instability and insecurity requires work at the bilateral, regional and international levels. The Western Group welcomes the efforts made by some countries to improve their national export behaviour and also welcomes the wish of others to participate with the original seven countries in the Missile Technology Control Regime. We will urgently pursue efforts in the United Nations and elsewhere to address the problem of excessive build-up of arms by ensuring transparency and restraint.

We welcome the successful completion and continued implementation of the INF Treaty which has eliminated and entire class of nuclear weapons. We welcome too the exchanged instruments of ratification and protocols between the United States and the Soviet Union for the two nuclear testing treaties, the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosion Treaty, on 11 December 1990 in Houston. We also welcome the START Treaty recently signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev which represents a major achievement in securing a more stable, predictable balance at lower levels of strategic nuclear forces. Once ratified, this treaty will reduce, over seven years, each side's strategic nuclear weapons from their current level of between 10,000 and 11,000 weapons down to between 8,000 and 9,000 weapons.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

The START agreement includes a major reduction in the most destabilizing and dangerous weapons, land-based ballistic missiles and their warheads, and places restrictions on specific types of strategic weapons.

We fully support the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue new talks on strategic offensive arms, and on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. This agreement was outlined in the joint statement of 1 June 1990 on future negotiations on nuclear and space arms and further enhancing strategic stability.

With regard to the implementation of agreements to facilitate further reductions in the sub-strategic nuclear forces, the Western Group of States, members of the Atlantic Alliance, stated the following in the July 1990 London Declaration:

> "The political and military changes in Europe, and the prospects of further changes, now allow the Allies concerned to go further. They will thus modify the size and adapt the tasks of their nuclear deterrent forces. They have concluded that, as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range. They have decided specifically that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe.
>
> "New negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is signed. The Allies concerned will develop an arms control framework for these negotiations which takes into account our requirements for far fewer nuclear weapons, and the diminished need for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range."

The members of the Western Group are actively working for further progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Western Group shares the objective of general and complete disarmament, but recognizes that its achievement will require a series of arms control steps in non-nuclear as well as nuclear areas. In these areas all States bear a responsibility.

In closing, the Western Group reiterates its will to continue to pursue vigorously the conclusion of disarmament agreements that enhance the security of all members of the community of nations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Ola Dahlman, who will introduce the report of the Group, which has been distributed today with the symbol CD/1097.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I will today introduce the progress report of the recent meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, contained in document CD/1097. This meeting, which was the thirty-second session of the Group, took place between 29 July and 9 August 1991. Experts and representatives from 28 countries participated. Representatives from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the International Maritime Satellite Organization, usually referred to as INMARSAT, participated in parts of the session. The Group enjoyed throughout the session the eminent services of the secretariat.

I am pleased to report to the CD on the successful conduct of the Group's Second Large Technical Test - usually referred to as GSETT-2. The test was conducted as planned between 22 April and 9 June 1991 and included six weeks of continuous data recording and reporting. As I have reported to the CD on earlier occasions this full-scale test has been carefully planned, and detailed instructions were prepared under the guidance of the coordinator of the test, Mr. Peter Basham of Canada. Several preparatory tests have also been conducted during the last two years. This approach, by which facilities needed for the full-scale test were gradually built up in participating countries, turned out to be most useful.

Thirty-four countries participated in the full-scale test. This is an increase of 10 countries compared to the preparatory test. The Ad Hoc Group very much welcomes this broadened participation, which includes also countries in Africa and South America. To a great extent this increased participation was obtained thanks to international cooperative efforts at a national and institute level. Countries having expertise and facilities supported, through bilateral arrangements, the establishment and operation of stations and national data centres in countries having less expertise in seismology.

The cooperative spirit among all participants in the test has been a cornerstone in our test without which we would never had succeeded. Many presentations in the Ad Hoc Group described and welcomed this cooperation and described how instruments, computer hardware and software were exchanged among participating institutes and how experts went to stations or data centres in other countries to help installing new equipment or to make existing computers and programs run properly or even to cope with the heavy workload during the conduct of the experiment.

This experiment has been a practical demonstration of close and successful international cooperation.

I will now try to describe the size and complexity of this full-scale test. The 34 participating countries contributed data from in all 60 seismological stations on all continents including Antarctica. Data were reported on a daily basis from these stations through national data centres to the four experimental international data centres operated in Australia, Sweden, the United States and the Soviet Union. In all more than 30,000 messages were exchanged during the six-week period. Information on more than 100,000 observed seismic signals were reported by the national data

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centres. These reports contained both parameter or level I data, giving a summary description of the observed signals, and the complete and thus more voluminous wave-form or level II data. The total amount of information exchanged would in expert language be described as over 1 gigabyte of data. To get an idea of the large amount of information involved we might think of this 1 gigabyte converted into statements in this very room. It would correspond to a statement that would go on for eight hours a day, seven days a week and that would last for the rest of this century.

The analysis of the 100,000 reported signals conducted at the four experimental international data centres made it possible to define and locate in all 6,000 events all over the globe. Nature challenged us - following a large earthquake in the Caucasus on 29 April several hundreds of aftershocks occurred during a short time. The large amount of data generated by these earthquakes stressed the system and caused overload at several centres, which was a useful experience.

To handle and exchange this amount of information on a global scale is a substantial undertaking even using modern communication technology and computers. We have challenged modern technology and utilized the most modern computer and communication systems available to cope with our task. We have successfully concluded a most extensive and complex experiment which goes beyond what has ever been conducted for scientific purposes in the field of seismology. It is also to my knowledge by far the most extensive multilateral test ever conducted for arms limitation and disarmament purpose. We did not get this for free.

The successful outcome of the test is the result of dedicated work by hundreds of people at seismological stations, and at national and international data centres, who by their enthusiasm, skill and long working days overcame the many practical problems that occurred throughout the test. On behalf of the Ad Hoc Group I wish to express our great appreciation to all these people around the world who so successfully contributed to our work.

At its session the Group reviewed the results and experience obtained at national and experimental international data centres. A large amount of information was brought forward, and only a tentative analysis and assessment could be made during the two-week session. Some preliminary results are compiled and annexed to the progress report; please allow me to make some preliminary comments in that regard.

Despite welcome participation in the full-scale test by a number of new countries the global distribution of participating stations is still uneven with almost half of the participants coming from Europe and few participants in Africa, Central and South America. The test demonstrated the power of the modern array stations, and a vast majority of the observations during the test came from such stations. We have to consider how to utilize this techology, which is becoming cheaper, on a global scale. The demonstration by Germany, to which also members of the CD were invited, was most timely and showed an interesting concept of a "CD station" built on modern technology.

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The national data centres seem to have been working in a satisfactory way all over the globe. Much effort has been put into these facilities, and it is important to consider how to maintain these facilities which are of crucial importance for a global system.

The international data exchange, between national and international and among the international data centres, which caused great problems during the preparatory experiments, now worked in a most satisfactory way. Data arrived promptly, and only a couple of hundreds out of 30,000 messages were lost, which is a remarkably low figure. It should be possible to improve the communication system even further by using a more homogenous system. Today a great variety of means are being utilized.

Analysis at the experimental international data centres was conducted utilizing both parameter and wave-form data. Parameter data were processed using an essentially automatic procedure, whereas the analysis of wave-form data requires interactive analysis where a seismological expert interacts with a graphic computer screen. The experimental international data centres managed, by and large, to cope with their heavy workload. The time available for comprehensive analysis of wave-form data was however limited. Further analysis of the valuable database collected during the experiment is needed to fully evaluate the full potential of the wave-form analysis. It is expected that such additional analysis will be undertaken at the experimental international data centres prior to the Group's next session.

The purpose of the experiment was, as its name indicates, to test the various technical components of the system. In addition, however, valuable information of a more basic character was obtained. A thorough analysis of this extensive material will take considerable time and has to be conducted in close cooperation with scientific institutions around the world. I will however make a few preliminary observations. The problem of associating observed signals to defined events is still a serious one, and almost half of the signals observed during this test were unassociated in the present analysis. The system designed by the Group is essentially a teleseismic system based on observations in the range of 2,000 to 10,000 km from the stations. It has been clearly demonstrated during this test and in the national scientific contributions to the Group that the observation capabilities at regional distances, e.g. up to 2,000 km from the stations, are very good. This might have an important implication on the design of the system. A third important issue is how to handle, in the context of the global system, the information provided by national seismological networks in individual countries, which is often of very high quality.

The Ad Hoc Group noted that a comprehensive evaluation of the results of GSETT-2 will be a substantial undertaking. It has established five study groups, each headed by a convener, to deal with different aspects of this evaluation work. The Ad Hoc Group will make all efforts to complete a report on a comprehensive evaluation of the technical aspects of the test during the

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spring session of 1992. The full seismological evaluation will need considerably more time, and will be reported on later. In this regard, the Group believes it will be desirable to have facilities available to the extent required for a successful evaluation of GSETT-2.

At the invitation of the Conference on Disarmament a representative of the International Maritime Satellite Organization, INMARSAT, attended a session of the Group and presented information on their global system for information exchange. INMARSAT also conducted a demonstration of its system, which was attended also by members of the Conference. INMARSAT now offers an interesting possibility of providing information exchange on a global scale from seismological and other monitoring stations located in areas where other high-quality means of communication are not available. The Group expressed its appreciation to INMARSAT for its valuable contribution to the Group's work.

The Ad Hoc Group continued preliminary discussion on its future work. It expressed the view that much valuable work can be conducted under its current mandate with regard to international cooperative measures to detect and identify seismic events. The Group expects to be able to develop specific recommendations in this regard during its next session, taking into account the results of GSETT-2.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 2 to 13 March 1992.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group for introducing the report, as well as for the useful information that he has given the Conference. With regard to the report in document CD/1097, the Ad Hoc Group transmits to us a recommendation contained in paragraph 19 under which it would meet next from 2 to 13 March 1992. I propose to submit the recommendation to the Conference at the next plenary meeting on Thursday, 22 August. Obviously any delegations that wish to make comments on the report contained in document CD/1097 can do so in the plenary then or later as they wish.

I have no further speakers on my list for today. I wonder whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor?

I should like now to refer to another matter. Today the secretariat has circulated a timetable of meetings that the Conference and its subsidiary bodies will hold during the coming week. The timetable was prepared following consultations with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual the calendar is of an indicative nature and can be amended if necessary. In this respect I should like to point out two changes that were agreed upon during the consultations held this morning in the bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The first involves the addition of a new meeting of Group C on Tuesday, 20 August at 3 p.m. The second relates to the meeting to be held on Friday, 23 August at 10 a.m. Instead of Group C, this meeting will be

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allocated to Group B. The secretariat will distribute the revised text in delegations' pigeon-holes. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Conference approves the timetable as amended orally.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no other business, and therefore I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Thursday, 22 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.